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highly fractionated policy process failed to clarify and explain its 
contributions to U S security Second, the opponents' claims that SALT II 
legitimated the Soviet buildup, prevented the U S from catching up and lulled 
the U S into a false sense of security, while tangential to the m a m  issues, 
were sufficient to convince others that the treaty lacked merit
Using the examples of the past, this essay proposes that the policy process 
be re-examined and redefined to permit more centralization, with consultation of 
the process within the executive branch, and that the process of consultation 
with the legislative branch be formalized From a national security
essay outlines a proposed long-term, incremental approach based 
ramework which has the potential for full integration of 
offensive and defensive systems in negotiations Finally, the consensus so 
necessary for domestic support for the maintenance of a viable deterrent force, 
militarily and politically, can only come from an arms control strategy designed 
for long-term rather than short-term objectives
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upon a common fr
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IDisarmament to "Arms Control"
To begin a survey of the historical precedents for today's efforts at arms 
control it is necessary to differentiate between disarmament and arms control 
For the purposes of the following discussion, disarmament will be used to denote 
those efforts whose goal was the abolition of arms and armament and prohibition 
against any use of armed force Arms control, on the other hand, is the attempt 
to regulate or limit certain aspects of the production, deployment or use of 
armaments
Arms control is not a new endeavor Virtually every weapon introduced as 
an improvement in the "business" of war has been accompanied by a call for that 
weapon's abolition One can find cases for the prohibition of the cross bow as 
well as the ICBM The introduction of fire arms into Europe resulted in the 
passage of laws prohibiting their employment and the penalties for captured 
users of these weapons, even in time of war, were of the sort normally reserved 
for the gravest of civil crimes However, as has been the case in modern times,
these weapons came to be accepted and were regarded as relatively inexpensive 
ways to insure against the consequences of hostile action by neighboring 
states
Just as surely as fire arms were accepted, disarmament proposals continued 
to surface and were, for the most part disregarded For example, in one of the 
treaties of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it was stipulated that combatants 
were to dismantle all fortifications and refrain from building new ones In 
1766 and again m  1769 Prussia rejected offers by Austria that the two countries 
limit armaments and reduce their forces After the Napoleonic wars the Tsar of 
Russia proposed an armaments reduction plan which was summarily dismissed by all 
the allied powers on the grounds that only sovereign nations, not international
2agreement, could or should determine their military requirements Until 1817, 
international agreement on arms control was virtually nonexistent If arms 
control was present in any form it was, and is today, in the prevalent 
strategies of isolation or neutrality, or the formation of alliances or leagues 
for collective defense While some would argue that those are hardly practices 
in arras control, it could easily be argued that by reducing the number of 
potential enemies that the requirement for security forces is smaller
In sharp contrast to the previously attempted methods of arras control, the 
freely negotiated Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817, which placed limits on the naval 
ciited States and Great Britain in the Great Lakes, was a major 
not an arms reduction agreement per se it did succeed in 
vessels in a specific deployment area (the Great Lakes) and could 
provided the impetus for subsequent general disarmament along 
the border between the United States and Canada
The rise of liberal thought and the beginnings of organized public opinion 
in the 19th century spawned an active but diffuse peace movement 
with disarmament as a principal aim While it might be possible to assert that 
the above factors alerted the public and fostered a predisposition for support 
of some measures to control armaments, it was only at the very end of the 19th 
century that one is able to point out specific arms control or disarmament 
proposals or agreements In May 1899, as a result of a call by Tsar Nicholas 
II, a conference was convened at the Hague This first Hague conference 
succeeded in the establishment of the permanent Court of Arbitration However, 
even arbitration between the signatory states was limited
forces of the U 
success While 
limiting naval 
be said to have
which occurred
3Arbitration agreements that are general usually exclude 
the vital interests of the nation, matters of honor and 
matters that affect the interests of third parties 1
The first Hague conference was not totally unsuccessful in the area of arras 
control and did issue an expanded and clarified proposal for the treatment of 
noncombatants as well as declarations on the use of expanding bullets and 
asphyxiating gases However, the predominant mood of the delegates was that 
armaments did not lead to war, but rather prevented it 2 The second conference 
in 1906 was no less limited in its impact in the arms control arena The 
discussion of disarmament lasted only half an hour, out of a four-month 
conference, and succeeded only in passing a declaration prohibiting the 
discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons Even that small effort 
was overshadowed by the explicit understanding that the declaration was to be 
binding only until the third Hague Conference, scheduled for 1914 The events 
of 1914 obviously precluded that third conference
Reaction and Assessment
The sheer magnitude of the death toll at the end of four years of war 
(approximately 10 million) and the introduction of new, more potent weapons, 
such as the machine gun, poison gas, the airplane and tanks contributed to the 
rise of a generation of anti-war poets, politicians, and pamphleteers 
Reflecting the feeling of a world at once stunned and mobilized by the 
destruction it had witnessed, President Wilson noted in a 1917 address to 
Congress
There can be no sense of safety and equity among the nations 
if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue 
here and ¿here to be built up and maintained The question of
armaments
practical
is the most immediately and intensely 
question connected with the present fortunes of
nations and mankind 3
President Wilson again took up this theme as he outlined his fourteen 
points for peace Ld reconstruction in a joint session of Congress in January
1918 The fourth point states that "adequate guarantees [be] given and taken 
that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with 
national safety
Given the rise of a large body of antiwar sentiment and the human need of 
apportioning guilt for the catastrophe of the first world war, the blame fell on 
two general groups— the munitions manufacturers who provided the means, and the 
states, including the Allied Powers, who purchased and ultimately used the 
weapons The obvious conclusion to this line of reasoning was
If greedy arms masters and their products had been a main
cause of 
national
the Great War, it followed that strictly limiting 
armaments would in itself do much to prevent war 5
Therefore, efforts at disarmament had twin targets a national limitation on
armament, and a curb on the monetary profit from war While it would seem that 
a limit on the former might necessarily limit the latter, a survey of the ^  „ 
literature of the time will show that the manufacturer was the more popular 
target More serious efforts by organizations and states, however, chose to 
focus on national limitations and those efforts attempted to follow two general
routes
Between tbe world wars, there were two basic approaches to regulating
armaments geographic demilitarization and arms limitation Demilitarization
5called for the establishment of geographic areas from which military forces and 
weapons were withdrawn and were not to be reintroduced The most notable 
achievement in geographic demilitarization was the Russo—Finnish Treaty of 1920» 
wherein three strategic zones along the frontiers of the two nations were to be 
militarily neutral The treaty not only held up through the entire inter-war 
period» there were few complaints of violations by either participant 6 Arras 
limitation, however, was a more elastic definition which could be include the 
maintenance of specified levels or reduction of arsenals and/or personnel over a 
specific time or m  a defined geographic area The second approach was further 
subdivided into two routes toward disarmament and/or arms limitation
Universal attempts at arms limitation or disarmament were generally under 
the patronage of the League of Nations and the cornerstone of these efforts was 
the attempt to disarm Germany Ostensibly toward the ultimate end of universal 
disarmament, the League established a permanent commission on military affairs 
and later created a preparatory commission for disarmament There is little 
doubt that however idealistic the motives of the League and their efforts toward 
a world disarmament conference, Germany remained the major target The second 
route pursued unilateral efforts to control specific types of weapons among a 
limited number of states The Washington Naval Treaties of 1922 could be 
considered the prime example In the midst of the pervasive sense of idealism 
and superimposed upon the various approaches to disarmament there was a more 
pragmatic dimension which remains to this day That was the debate on the 
quantitative versus qualitative value of arms and arsenals Much of the modern 
discussion and debate on arms control reflects the issues raised during the 
interwar period
6Toward Arras Control
The route toward universal disarmament was virtually a dead end Its 
failure «as predetermined Not only was the goal overly ambitious but the 
attempts to use Germany as the model of the disarmed state through imposed 
little credence to the professed purposes of the effort 
as a vanquished state with no political capital invested in 
the system, Germany had little reason to view efforts toward disarmament as 
either a benevolint movement or one by whose rules it should be bound
disarmament lent 
In addition,
Predictably, the rise of National Socialism in Germany with its demands for
rearmament, and i:he concomitant alarm in Europe undercut the League's efforts
Finally, Germany s withdrawal from the League of Nations m  1935 ended the World 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva and served as the de facto if not the de jure
end to other uni 
The alterna
versal disarmament efforts
te route of negotiated limitations was rather more successful 
Of particular note were the seven treaties and twelve resolutions produced by 
the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 While only two of the treaties could
be said to have significant arms control provisions, the sheer magnitude of the 
issues considered and the results of the four-month conference marked a new high 
for arms control efforts in the 1920s The Five Power Naval Treaty brought 
about a reduction in battleships, quantitative limits on capital ships and 
aircraft carriers, qualitative restrictions on naval construction and 
restrictions on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific It also 
established a tacit recognition by the delegates of Japan's pre-eminence in the 
western Pacifii A second Five Power Treaty failed ratification but was
7significant in that its arms control provisions which addressed submarine and 
chemical warfare were adopted in other fora 7
Admittedly, the Five Power Treaties did not limit auxiliary warships, nor 
did they enhance the U S Navy's strategic position in the Pacific However, 
the naval pact did make its mark in several respects It was a freely 
negotiated, multilateral treaty based on reciprocity which created a 
recognizable naval balance of power among the United States, Great Britain,
Japan, Italy, and France A costly and dangerous naval arms race (at least in 
terms of capital ships) was deferred and the precedent reinforced for both 
quantitative and qualitative controls on armaments Finally, it was generally 
observed by all parties and contributed significantly to the London Treaty of 
1930 which brought all warships of the three major naval powers under 
limitation That the treaties themselves did not survive the political 
conditions which led to World War II is not necessarily an indictment of the 
treaties At best treaty making is only, in part, reliant on acts of prophecy, 
the process must first consider contemporary reality That they did not survive 
merely accents a potential flaw in any contractual arrangement— an inability to 
reliably predict the future The only alternative is to abstain from any treaty 
arrangements
Although outside the confines of what are normally recognized as treaties, 
at least two other efforts to control weapons between the wars warrant mention 
The first is the General Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare of 1925 
This document might be said to be the prototype of the post nuclear era treaties 
which were designed to limit nuclear weapons Its primary aim was the 
prohibition of the use in war of gases and bacteriological weapons Of more 
particular pertinence to later treaties was its attempt to deal with specific
8weapons and to distinguish between them Even as it sought to limit the use of 
particular weapons in time of war, the protocol did not, however, forbid or 
limit the manufacture, possession, testing, or even domestic use of such 
weapons
The second of the efforts was the Soviet proposal for "General and Complete 
Disarmament," presented at the World Disarmament Conference in 1932 The 
significance is not so much in the concept of complete disarmament but in the 
shift of emphasis in Soviet foreign policy Prior to 1925 the Soviets had 
maintained that disarmament and collective security was their ultimate goal 
Between 1925 and 1932 a move away from that view became evident, culminating in 
the aforementioned proposal which denied that any link between disarmament and 
arbitration, e g , collective security agreements of the type envisioned by the 
League of Nations ®
During World War II the return of Soviet foreign policy to collective 
security arrangements was rapid The pragmatic assessment of continued 
viability of the Soviet Union without such arrangements generated an inescapable 
conclusion,that is, without allied help the Soviet Union would cease to exist 
After the war the Soviets returned to their pre-war position opposing 
arbitration of collective security arrangments with the West Apparently, as 
the League of Nations became the United Nations, the concept of general 
security, which had its roots in the Soviet proposal, became more popular 
Inherent in the shift from collective security (and thus arbitration) to the 
concept of general security is the shift from the notion of disarmament toward
that of arms control
The shift in emphasis is clearly delineated in the United Nations charter 
which ostensibly deals with "disarmament " Article 2, paragraph 1 states
9The General Assembly may consider the General Principles o 
Co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and 
security including the principles governing disarmament and 
The Regulation of Armaments and make recommendations with 
regard to such principles To the members or to the Security 
Council or both 9 (emphasis added)
The change in emphasis is even more evident in Article 26, which outlines 
the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council, as follows
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security with the least division for 
armaments of the world's economic resources, the Security 
Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in 
Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United 
Nations for the establishment of A System for the Regulation 
of Armaments 10 (emphasis added)
Arms control was seen to be a less elusive goal than disarmament by the 
authors of the Charter However, the entry, In August 1945, into the lexicon of 
armaments of the word -nuclear" effectively took all but the least Important
issues out of the hands of the United Nations
Recognition of the fact that while the issues of arms control may have 
remained qualitatively the same they could never be quantitatively the same was 
not slow in coming to the United Nations In what was to be a futile attempt to 
revert to a non-nuclear world, the Moscow Communique of December 1945 and the 
subsequent adoption of portions of it by the U N General Assembly marked the 
last time that the Soviets and the West would agree on sweeping, non-specific 
issues of disarmament The General Assembly resolution 1(1) (24 January 1946) 
proposed the establishment of the U N Atomic Energy Commission and Item V (cc)
10
addresses the issue of nuclear disarmament directly
the Commission shall make specific proposals for
the elimination from national arrangements of atomic weapons 
and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction
The early deliberations and apparent agreement on the ultimate goal of 
nuclear disarmament were just a prelude to the debates which were to begin in 
June 1946 and continue to the present
In little more than a month after Hiroshima, the U S began to consider the 
implications for a post-war world of nuclear technology In view of the 
apparent success enjoyed by the unanimously adopted U N resolution establishing 
the Commission on Atomic Energy, the Truman administration sought to take the 
most direct approach and commissioned then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
and a board of consultants including David Lilienthal to formulate a plan for 
the international control of atomic energy The Acheson-Lilienthal report 
proposed the creation of a monopoly over nuclear research and development by a 
supernational atomic energy authority This authority would have sole control 
over research, development, and uses of atomic energy including the acquisition 
of raw materials The authority would manage, inspect and control all atomic 
activities but was given no specific power against those who might circumvent
its authority
President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as the spokesman to the U N for 
the report Baruch agreed but suggested that the lack of power for sanctions 
was a serious flaw and proposed to revise the plan accordingly Acheson 
disagreed, maintaining that the Commission was a mechanism for providing a 
warning signal and that sanctions would or could be taken unilaterally by one of 
the major powers against a violator Baruch maintained that a Security Council
11
veto by one of the major powers could effectively override punitive action voted 
by a majority of the Security Council and negate any possibility of punishment 
for violation The differences in approach are basic— Acheson attempted to 
place a supernational power in control of technology while maintaining the 
concept of national sovereignty for enforcement, Baruch attempted to separate 
atomic matters from issues of sovereignty and place them under a limited form of 
world government Truman backed Baruch H
The Baruch plan was submitted to the U N in June 1946 with the addendum 
that the proposed international agency be given all Information pertaining to 
the production of atomic energy— but only after sanctions against potential 
violators had been defined by treaty and adequate systems of control were in 
place The United States would then turn over its technical data and facilities 
in stages, with destruction of its small arsenal of nuclear weapons to take 
place at the end of the last stage
Andrei Gromyko delivered the Soviet response to the U S proposal that same 
month In keeping with the aforementioned shift in Soviet policy which had its 
roots in the Prewar General Disarmament Declaration, the Soviet scheme proposed 
an immediate prohibition on the production and use of nuclear weapons with 
destruction of existing arsenals to take place within three months of the 
Adoption of their resolution In addition, the procedures for enforcement in 
the Soviet proposal were to be decided upon within six months of :he entry into 
force of the convention but were to be subject to veto in the Security Council 
Among other matters subject to discussion were to be methods of inspection 
(modern analysts may prefer verification as the appropriate term)
U S position was control first then disarm, the Soviets disarm first then 
discuss control Despite efforts by the U N the positions of the two nations
In short the
12
did not change for almost a decade
Important as the U N efforts and U S and Soviet proposals were at the 
moment, they take on additional importance when compared to earlier efforts at 
disarmament and/or arms control Evident in the general area of arms control 
immediately following World War II is a philosophical shift Arms control 
became the more operative term in appreciation of the evidence that attempts at 
general disarmament were doomed to failure That philosophical shift had its 
roots in the belief that the "rush to disarm" in the period immediately 
following World War I precipitated or at least did nothing to prevent World War 
II Certainly if there was any resistance to that philosophical shift it was 
dealt a mortal blow in September 1949 when the Soviet Union tested its first 
nuclear device With superpower status of the Soviet Union and the United 
States at least tacitly codified, the notion that arms control could be an 
avenue down which the superpowers might walk, rather than run an arms race, 
became more popular The theory was that if through arms control the 
antagonists could be made gradually more interdependent, perhaps some form of 
partial or general disarmament might follow
Attempts to draw lessons from the past are as suspect as any other 
generalities, however, at an abstract level arms control efforts began to 
resemble functional theory By accepting lesser goals and small achievements, 
arras control sought to institutionalize, at an international level, cooperation 
for security by potential adversaries Inherent in functionalism as it applies 
to arms control is the knowledge that progress may be slow and will be by 
definition incremental However, the growth of an interdependent relationship 
toward the climate of cooperation necessary to arms control was and continues to 
be subject to the vagaries of sudden crises in relations between nations as well
13
political events at the national level
In the early 1950s a new term entered the lexicon of armaments and 
simultaneously appeared to make more urgent that the superpowers attempt to 
resolve or manage their differences without resorting to war That term 
megaton— connotes destructive power unimagined only a few short years before 
It meant that in one weapon could be contained more destructive power than all 
the bombs dropped on Germany in World War II The U S éxploded its first 
fusion bomb in November 1952 The Soviet Union tested a similar device in 
August 1953 It was in March 1954, however, that the full implications of the 
potential of "megatonnage" came to the attention of the public
During the U S test on Bikini Atoll a crew of Japanese fishermen were 
exposed to "fallout" 120 miles from the test site One died and twenty-three 
were hospitalized Increased radioactivity was also detected in Japan,
Australia, the U S and Europe As a result public discussions of "fallout" and 
"strontium 90" increased as did "duck and cover drills" and the construction of 
home fallout shelters The obvious increase in destructive capability may have 
in itself contributed to a slight decrease in the level of antagonism between 
the superpowers There were other contributing factors as well
Along with the fusion bomb, other events that led to some easing of tension 
and the potential for increased flexibility were the death of Stalin and growing 
realization of the difficulties in international management of nuclear 
technology The death of Stalin in March 1953 was the precipitating factor in a 
power struggle and debate over the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs 
While western observers were not privy to the details of the controversy, there 
were attempts and some successes under Malenkov and, later, Khrushchev at 
reestablishing cultural and other contacts with the west At the same time
14
western leadership began to look critically at the effectiveness of arms control 
efforts to date and found them wanting The attempts to place nuclear 
technology under international control were obvious failures, and the future 
held little promise for success As a result, some began to explore 
alternatives Again, the answer seemed to come back to the categorical or 
incremental approaches, such as the Geneva accords or Washington Naval Treaties 
that had found some success in the past The U S  in particular was presented 
with an opportunity for increased flexibility, unwittingly or not, by the French 
rejection of the Baruch plan The implications for policy were obvious— it is 
one thing to face opposition to total ban on control of nuclear weaponry from 
one's enemies, but it is quite another to see opposition from one's friends 
Given at least tacit recognition by the U S that disarmament in the nuclear 
arena was highly improbable, if not impossible, and that the "Cold War" was 
growing even chillier, other alternatives were pursued In an attempt to 
alleviate tension President Eisenhower in his "Atoms for Peace" address in 
December 1953 outlined new directions and linkages for arms control much more 
boldly than had President Truman in his 1950 U N address, which offered to 
"consider the control of conventional and nuclear weapons together " President 
Eisenhower continued to plead for international control (one might suspect as a 
matter of form) but suggested that new directions be taken
open up a new channel for peaceful discussions and 
initiate a new approach to the many and difficult problems 
that must be solved in both private and public conversations 
if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and 
is to make progress toward peace 12
15
The new direction was to be seen in various proposals by both sides but of major 
importance was a move toward what might today be termed "confidence building
measures" (CBMs)
As was previously mentioned, the "new" Soviet leadership apparently began 
to move toward peaceful coexistence by pursuing policies aimed at gradually 
reducing international tensions While some could argue that the policy was 
simply designed to fulfill their immediate need to consolidate their power base 
at home, the external symptoms of change were an emerging flexibility in foreign 
policy Between 1950 and 1955, the negotiations for a Korean armistice were 
concluded and the Austrian State Treaty, which marked a major break with Europe 
for the Soviets, was concluded after a decade of negotiations In addition, the 
Soviets sought rapprochement with Yugoslavia, invited the West German Chancellor 
to Moscow, and attempted trade discussions with the Japanese On the U S side, 
bright moments for accommodation were somewhat harder to find Collective 
security agreements such as the integration of West Germany into NATO, and other 
anti-communist arrangements in the Middle East, Asia, and the western hemisphere 
seemed to be the order of the day Optimism was strengthened with U S efforts 
to institutionalize its arms control bureaucracy by the creation of a White 
House Office for Arms Control and the appointment of Harold Stassen as the 
Special Assistant for Disarmament Hopes for progress were further heightened 
when the two superpowers agreed to a summit meeting in Geneva to begin the 18th 
of July 1955 On July 21st President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" 
proposal The "open skies" proposal was not only a restatement of the issue of 
verification but was also aimed at confidence building through 
nonconfrontational policy by pledging that the U S would never conduct an 
aggressive war As a further effort to break old patterns of thinking about
16
arms control, Its optimistic call for the major powers to exchange "blueprints 
of their military establishments and permit open reconnaissance over their 
national territories took "confidence building" to a point beyond that for which 
either side was really ready While the Soviets rejected the proposal as 
seeking control without disarmament, it was clear that both sides were ready 
acknowledge at least two things C D  that an international regime did not exist 
which could deal with arms control issues, and (2) that if any hope lay in arms 
control, a climate of confidence and compromise was essential to the process 
Unfortunately, acknowledgment of the existence of preconditions and political
reality did not lead to their resolution
As the debate over the "open skies" proposal continued, the differences
between the two superpowers deepened, with charges and counter charges doing 
little to alleviate the tension of the Cold War After a great deal of 
rhetoric, in the spring of 1956 the U S government placed a reservation on all 
its previous proposals for arms control and disarmament, effectively withdrawing 
from the discourse By the fall of that year the Soviet Union began to take 
full propaganda advantage of the situation and forwarded proposals for 
denuclearized zones in both Germanies, reduction in military budgets, and the 
cessation of all nuclear tests On a more practical scale, they also suggested 
that agreement could be reached on an 800-kilometer zone on both sides of the 
line in Europe for aerial reconnaissance However, just as it appeared that the 
dialogue might resume, an increase in international tension brought on by the 
Hungarian uprising aborted the exchange, and for most of the next year the 
superpowers oscillated between animosity and conciliation While the London 
meeting of the U N Disarmament Commission offered some evidence that the two 
sides might be close to a deal on test limitations and verification, the Soviets
17
finally refused further negotiation and the conference ended without significant 
results
If anything could be said about arms control activity during the first five 
years of the Eisenhower administration, it would be that slowly but surely there 
appeared to be emerging a trend away from comprehensive agreements much the same 
way that nations had drifted away from broad disarmament agreements toward 
functionalism, thereby giving rise to theories of arras control The next 
logical step in that evolution was to move from comprehensive agreement packages 
toward more limited goals That is, both sides seemed to desire functional 
negotiations m  which agreements could be reached in limited fields for specific 
goals As evidence, one can see that two species of agreement seemed to be 
emerging The first was of a bilateral nature aimed at a specific problem in 
the arms control field For example, although it was to be several years later, 
the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty is a noted success of this type The second 
type could be considered geographical in nature and aimed at establishing "arms 
free" zones Of this type, the 1961 Antarctic Treaty is a prime example
Of the first type of agreement discussed above the roots of the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty lie in proposals for unilateral action In March 1958, the 
Soviet Union announced that they would unilaterally discontinue nuclear testing 
and called upon "other states" to take similar action Of note is the fact that 
at the time they had recently completed a series of tests and the U S was known 
to be planning tests That knowledge and a proviso in the Moscow announcement 
that the U S S R  could continue testing in the "interests of security" if other 
states did not adopt a similar posture tended to cast doubt on the seriousness 
of Soviet intentions By August, however, the U S , having made advancement in 
the capability to detect nuclear tests, issued a similar proclamation with the
18
proviso that testing would cease for one year as soon as negotiations on a test 
ban began Less than a month later the Soviets conducted two nuclear tests, 
thereby throwing further into doubt the sincerity of their March declaration 
The outcome of this exchange of unilateral declarations, however sincere, was a 
tripartite conference (United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain) which was 
aimed at the discontinuance of nuclear tests What had been demonstrated was 
that through chance or design both the United States and the Soviet Union had 
found a functional area in which negotiations could take place for mutual 
benefit
The road to agreement was to be long and difficult By 1959 the United 
States and Britain had shown added flexibility and in keeping with the evolution 
of the incremental "functionalist" approach dropped the demand that a test ban 
be linked to other progress toward disarmament While this move facilitated 
additional flexibility with the Soviets, the "new nuclear power" France (not a 
party to the negotiations) demonstrated its independence by testing its first 
weapon Only days before the test the U S had also proposed threshold limits 
on underground testing While this was an idea whose time had not yet come, it 
again points out how an incremental approach to specific problems can bear fruit 
if accompanied by patience and persistence
The area of geographically defined "arms free" zones referred to earlier 
also enjoyed some success during this period In attempts to unravel the myriad 
problems associated with weapons restrictions and despite the relative lack of 
success in the past of negotiated demilitarized zones, the Antarctic Treaty was 
signed on the first of December 1959 The negotiations capitalized on the 
feelings generated by the international geophysical year to set aside Antarctica 
for "peaceful purposes " Twelve countries, known as the "consultative parties,"
19
signed the original treaty Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union The treaty itself is very specific about prohibiting 
militarization Article I, for instance, reads
Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only There 
shall be prohibited inter alia, any measures of a military 
nature, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers as well 
as the testing of any type of weapons 13
The treaty is of thirty years duration and of obvious interest will be the 
behavior of the signitories and others in the international community when they 
reconsider it in 1989 While the relative successes enjoyed by the test ban 
negotiations and the Antarctic Treaty were significant, perhaps more important 
was the fate of broad, comprehensive proposals in light of international
events
Concurrently with the negotiations on a limited test ban and the Antarctic 
Treaty, the Geneva Conference was devoting itself to the larger issue of 
complete and general disarmament In addition, by the spring of 1959, a summit 
between President Eisenhower and Secretary Khrushchev was being planned While 
the general conference was in recess and during planning for the summit, an 
American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territory The 
summit was cancelled The Geneva Conference did reconvene, only to witness a 
walkout by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact participants which ended the ten-nation 
conference Perhaps the Geneva Conference was doomed to failure in its attempt 
to embrace issues too broad, at any rate it certainly appeared to be more 
susceptible to the fortunes of the international environment than were fora with 
a narrower focus Of the conference itself John Barton and Lawrence Weiler
20
note
Negotiations were clearly never serious the United
States feared a soviet lead in ICBM development and was less 
interested in arms control than in redressing this perceived 
strategic imbalance Propaganda exchanges were the order of 
the day as the west sought to blunt the impact of 
Khrushchev's GCD (General and Complete Disarmament) campaign 
moreover, —  the United States and its limited
organizational resources were largely devoted to test ban 
negotiations Finally the summit collapse implied that any 
new effort would have to wait the advent of a new 
administration in Washington ^
The "new" administration arrived in Washington with definite ideas about 
strategic balance and arms control Within the first year of his 
administration, President Kennedy appointed an arms control advisor, stressed 
the importance of arms control in his first State of the Union address and 
pushed for enabling legislation to begin to redress the problem of "limited 
organizational resources" referred to above Congress established the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in September 1961, and charged it with 
four principal duties
(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for 
arms control and disarmament policy formulation,
(b) The preparation for and management of United States 
participation m  international negotiations in the arms 
control and disarmament field,
(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information 
concerning arms control and disarmament, and
(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, 
direction of United States participation in such control 
systems as may become part of United States arms control and 
disarmament activities 15
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The establishment of ACDA was significant in at least two ways it recognized a 
gap in capability and expertise within the existing governmental structure and, 
with the possible exception of the Senate rejection of the Versailles Treaty in 
1919, signaled the beginnings of congressional interest in arms control
Prior to the establishment of ACDA, both the Soviet Union and the U S had 
begun a new series of nuclear tests, and both parties also had issued a 
"statement of agreed principles" as a result of bilateral talks that had begun 
in the spring As communiques crossed between the two superpowers over whether 
controls should precede disarmament (the U S position) or disarmament precede 
control (the Soviet position), the two moved closer to collision
In October 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers to the 
brink of nuclear war While it is clear that both sides recognized the gravity 
of the situation, whether or not it served as the catalyst for the negotiations 
and agreements to follow is subject to debate Regardless of the reasons, 
important steps were taken in the next few years which led to agreements which 
are still in force and, perhaps more importantly, are still observed By the 
end of December 1962, President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had exchanged a 
series of letters on the subject of a test ban treaty and the U S had submitted 
a working paper on "the reduction of the risk of war through accident, 
miscalculation, or failure of communication " The second annual ACDA report 
noted that the Soviet Union was willing to accept "in principle" the 
establishment of unmanned seismic stations on its home territory for the 
detection of nuclear tests 16 The two major headings of these discussions were
to bear fruit within a few months
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In April 1963 negotiations began on the issue which could be traced most 
directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis— communications between the superpowers 
One need only recall the famous "two messages" incident to realize the critical 
importance of immediate, clear communications in the event of a crisis By 
June, "the memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Soviet 
Union regarding the establishment of a direct communications link" was signed 
For obvious reasons the memorandum became popularly known as "the hot line 
agreement " Perhaps more important, however, than the rapidity with which it 
was negotiated or the significance of the agreement as an arms control device 
was its value in facilitating an environment more amenable to arms control 
More briefly, its symbolic value in narrowing the gap between the superpowers 
was a major advantage Less than two months later, what has been called the 
most important post-war agreement on arras control was signed
The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed August 5, 1963 and was the 
culmination of several weeks of discussions between the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union While the origins of the treaty can be 
traced back several years, the limited nature of the treaty was far from its 
original conception as a comprehensive ban In recognition of the intransigence 
of the negotiating partners on certain issues such as on-site inspection, the 
incremental approach once again proved successful The Limited Test Ban Treaty 
banned nuclear testing m  three environments the atmosphere, outer space, and 
under water Although considered as an important breakthrough by some, the 
treaty has not been a universal success despite the fact that by 1980, some 112 
countries had signed it President Kennedy said of the treaty just before
ratification
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the first time we have been able to reach an agreement 
which can limit the dangers of this [nuclear] age The 
agreement itself is limited, but its message of hope has been 
heard this small step toward safety can be followed
by others ^
In asking for ratification Secretary of State Dean Rusk reminded the Senate 
that it had ratified without reservation 943 treaties since 1789 and offered the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty as "one of the most significant occasions for the 
exercise of that prerogative"18 and as a step away from the arras race 
Predictably, at least up to that point in U S history, discussion by the Senate 
was minimal and ratification followed in October only two months after 
negotiations concluded
There appear to be several factors which made the "hot line agreement" and 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty come together so rapidly First, very careful 
groundwork had been laid, especially in the case of the test ban, for more 
comprehensive agreements which were at the time unattainable The flexibility 
engendered by a "fallback" to a more incremental approach, however, did lend 
itself to "less perfect" but workable agreements Even now, twenty years later, 
the lack of participation by France and China do not appear to have had 
appreciable effect of the functioning of the Limited Test Ban Treaty
Second, the limited nature of the agreements and, concomitantly, the 
forseeable consequences of these accords gave rise to considerably less anxiety 
in those charged with ratification The broad spirit of bipartisanship which 
characterized the foundation of policy toward Soviet-American relations made 
ratification relatively easy Finally, one cannot discount the effect the two 
leaders of the United States and Soviet Union had upon the negotiations and 
subsequent agreements The assertion that President Kennedy and Chairman
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Khrushchev played important personal roles in insuring the 1963 agreements is 
made more credible by the fact that after 1963 some momemtum was lost in arms 
control efforts Both were removed from office shortly after the agreements 
were signed-President Kennedy by assassination, Chairman Khrushchev by purge 
While arms control talks between the superpowers were "on the back burner" until 
their resurgence in the SALT negotiations during the Nixon administration, other 
fora served as the arena for arms control in the mid 1960s
A series of multilateral treaties were designed in the mid to late 1960s 
which have been called important milestones by some All were of the regional 
or geographic type typified by the Antarctic Treaty That is, they attempted to 
declare certain areas or regions as "nuclear free zones " The first example, 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which attempted to declare Latin America a "nuclear 
free zone," has thus far failed to gain ratification by those countries in the 
region which are considered to have nuclear potential, particularly Brazil and 
Argentina The second and third examples-the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
rhe Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" and the Sea Bed Arms Treaty-have, at least
thus far, apparently been more successful They covered relatively 
non-controversial areas and offered to the world at large an opportunity to 
participate in the arms control process relatively independently of the cooling
relations between the superpowers
Perhaps the most significant of the treaties to come from fora other than 
bilateral negotiations between the superpowers-the Non-proliferation 
Treaty-had its roots in a 1958 proposal to the United Nations by Ireland Of 
significance was superpower involvement in that it was clear that no such 
agreement was likely to be forthcoming without the consent and support of both
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the United States and Soviet Union Indeed, it was not until 1968 that the 
superpowers submitted identical drafts of a treaty to the U N General Assembly 
and it was passed To date more than 100 countries have ratified the treaty 
Of greater significance is the fact that until the superpowers agreed that it 
was in their best interest to attempt to curtail the spread of nuclear weaponry,
an agreement was impossible
Although the treaties thus far, albeit briefly, addressed are considered 
benchmarks in the area of arms control, it was clear by the late sixties or 
early seventies, if not before, that successful attempts on arms control hinges 
on the concurrence of the superpowers Several other factors also began to 
emerge as influences on arms control Thus far, technology had developed well 
in advance of attempts to control arms and was, for the most part, not a subject 
of negotiation Economic factors, insofar as the maintenance of large arsenals 
were concerned, were beginning to emerge as more important criteria in the 
acceptability of arms control proposals Differences in strategic doctrine and 
perceptions of strategic balances were fast becoming major influences on the 
relations between the superpowers Finally, the differences in societal and 
political systems and the concomitant abilities of each nation to negotiate
freely and flexibly became more apparent
By the late 1960s arms control had become a "growth industry Some ^
limited successes were achieved but the up and down relationship of the 
superpowers overshadowed the prospects of meaningful efforts at arms control 
Proposals were still being presented in the various United Nations fora which 
called for "general and complete disarmament" but it should be safe to say that 
most nations had admitted privately, if not publicly, that the best hope was 
some moderation of the arms race President Johnson's 1964 proposal calling for
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a "verified freeze"19 on offensive and defensive arms at the current levels was 
summarily rejected by the Soviet Union "20 By 1967 evidence of research by both 
the superpowers toward ballistic missile defense surfaced and the Soviets were 
displaying a limited version of such a defense around Moscow The U S voiced 
its intention of building such a defense and by the first half of 1968 had 
acknowledged capability of delivering multiple independently targetable missile 
warheads Some progress was made toward the initiation of arms control talks, 
however, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dampened enthusiasm, at least 
temporarily, in the United States By the end of the Johnson administration, 
however, it had become patently obvious to both sides, however, that if they 
„are to discuss arms control or limitation, the primary targets for such talks
were already identified
Strategy and Doctrine
AS the Nixon administration took office the essential signal for arms 
control was "not so fast " Feeling that a total assessment of U S military 
posture, capabilities and strategy was in order, the administration made it 
clear to all concerned that it was not to be bound by the policies of its 
predecessor However, the superpowers did agree to meet in Helsinki in November 
for what was to be the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
Between November 1969 and May 1972 there were seven SALT sessions alternating 
between Helsinki and Geneva While a "blow by blow" acccount of the two and 
one-half years of negotiating are beyond the purview of this paper, certain 
trends in strategic outlook, negotiating behavior, organizational structure, and 
political decision processes are discernible, and it is on these so-called 
peripheral areas that I will concentrate
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In strategic outlook, at least In the public pronouncements of their views, 
the Soviet Union and the United States were markedly different Various 
observers of the time felt sure that the Soviet Union lagged behind the U S in 
strategic thought as well as in strategic technology To U S strategists the 
seemingly bellicose statements about the ultimate triumph of Socialism even 
through victory in nuclear war were merely evidence of a failure to proceed 
along the learning curve as rapidly as had the Americans In fact, one could 
reasonably argue that it was the Soviets who truly understood strategy in its 
classic sense-that is to devise means for winning a war Of the American 
"strategy" of assured destruction Benjamin Lambeth has provided one of the most
cogent critiques
Although commonly called a "strategy", "assured destruction" 
was by itself an antithesis of strategy Unlike any strategy 
that ever preceded it throughout the history of armed 
conflict* it ceased to be useful precisely where military 
strategy is supposed to come into effect at the edge of 
war 21
Noted Soviet specialist John Erickson has summarized the disparate views of the 
principals
The disdain shown towards the quality (or lack of quality) 
Soviet strategic thinking was a marked feature of the I960 s 
rooted in the supposed intellectual superiority of American 
sophistication in matters of "deterrent theory and 
encouraging the notion that during the SALT I process the US 
would perforce initiate the Soviet Union into the mysteries of 
deterrent theory and the complexities of nuclear war u
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The "doctrinal gap" was evident in public pronouncements and was a factor, 
although not the primary consideration, in the deployment of the "deterrent 
forces" of both sides— the U S with a "triad" of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, the 
Soviets with a predominantly ICBM force The most compelling evidence of the 
"gap" was the ways in which the two sides looked at defensive measures (in SALT 
I represented by anti-ballistic missile [ABM] defenses) The U S view of ABM 
or other defensive measures was skeptical at best Secretary of Defense 
McNamara explained that Soviet expenditures on "sievelike" defensive systems was 
best explained by "fanaticism" and an "emotional reaction to the need to defend 
Mother Russia "23 Thus the predictable U S response to a Soviet ABM would be 
to saturate that "sievelike" defense That is precisely what happened as the 
U S teste d multiple-independently targetable-reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on its 
ICBMs By way of contrast, the Soviet view of defensive systems was 
diametrically opposed Premier Kosygin expressed the Soviet view in this
manner
As regards an anti-missile system, our position is well known 
We believe that the discussion should not center merely on the 
problem of an anti-missile defense system Because after all, 
the anti-missile system is not a weapon of aggression, of 
attack, it is a defensive system 24
And in response to another question on ABM he said
Which weapons should be regarded as a tension 
factor— offensive or defensive weapons9 I think that a 
defensive system which prevents attack, is not a cause of the 
arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of 
people An anti-missile system may cost more than an 
offensive one, but it is intended not for killing people but 
for saving human lives 25
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It is not, therefore, particularly surprising that the two sides found 
little common ground in the language of deterrent theory or in matters of 
military doctrine upon which to base their negotiations In the pursuit of what 
was to be the SALT I Treaty other differences of a more historical nature 
remained
As has been alluded to earlier, the Soviets and Americans approached SALT 
with different negotiation styles In keeping with the historical record of 
broad disarmament proposals, the penchant for "disarmament before control" and 
other proposals oriented toward much stronger political than strategic/military 
impact, the Soviets once again showed a penchant for "agreements in principle 
By way of contrast, the Americans were, in keeping with the historical "control 
before disarmament" approach, engaged in presenting detailed, specific 
adjustments to military arsenals in an effort to enhance their view of strategic 
stability and "mutual deterrence " Obviously each approach had its advantages 
The Soviet approach offered more flexibility, the U S approach was better at 
establishing the prerequisites for what was essentially a contractual 
relationship The viewpoints of technical exercise versus political statement 
were to continue throughout SALT I and into START An advocacy statement of 
which is the better approach is not intended These stances are merely 
highlighted in order to illuminate the obstacles to negotiation y '
In keeping with the "broad" versus "narrow" views of the proper focus of 
arms control it is not surprising that the first substantive issue to surface in 
SALT I was a disagreement over what constituted "strategic forces The U S 
favored a "central strategic" systems agreement with only forces of 
intercontinental range and defenses against them be included in the talks The 
Soviets argued that all systems, including U S Forward Based Systems (FBS)
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capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet homeland, be included By 
the last year of negotiating it became apparent that the two sides were unable 
to adequately address the issue, but it was to re-emerge in SALT II and despite 
the presence of separate INF talks, again in START The second impasse was 
whether or not any agreement could or should limit both offensive and defensive 
weapons The Soviet Union proposed that the negotiations concentrate on ABM 
limitations and leave the offensive limitations to SALT II There were, 
apparently, two possible and mutually reinforcing explanations for Soviet 
willingness to negotiate what had been described as a purely defensive system 
not a weapon of aggression First, the primary Soviet aim was to halt 
deployment of the technically superior American "Safeguard" system and the 
Soviets were, therefore, prepared to entertain measures that would restrict ABM 
on both sides 26 Second, if focus were shifted to ABM, the Soviets would not 
have to propose limitations on specific weaponry and thereby reveal what they 
felt was a weaker strategic military position vis-a-vis the United States 27 
The popular misconception that the Soviet Union had accepted the basic tenets of 
MAD and were no longer interested in defensive systems is discounted here One 
need look no further than Marshal Grechko's speech to the session of the Supreme 
Soviet on September 29, 1972 in which he endorsed the ABM Treaty but noted "At 
the same time, it does not place any limits on carrying out research and 
experimental work directed toward solving the problems of defense of the country 
against nuclear/missile attack "28 The obvious inference was that the ABM 
Treaty had not forclosed continuing efforts to find an effective strategic 
defense for the Soviet Union
There were at least two other issues of substance upon which there was 
apparently no common ground— those of heavy missiles and submarine launched
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ballistic missiles (SLBMs) The 0 S insisted that SLBMs be included in any 
agreement and further asserted a need to limit the number, size, and definition 
of "heavy" missiles, the Soviets firmly rejected both U S proposals Obviously 
the Soviets "needed" to catch up in SLBMs and maintain their investment in heavy 
ICBMs The impasse over both issues was to be resolved by principals not 
normally present at the formal negotiating sessions "Back channel" 
negotiations between then White House advisor, later Secretary of State, 
Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin led to the partial resolution of the 
impasse on SLBM, during the pre-summit meeting in Moscow in April 1972 The
Soviets "acquiesced" to the inclusion of SLBMs in the interim agreement Later
the Soviets also agreed in principle to a heavy missile sublimit This 
acquiesence, however, failed to shed much light on the real issue, since they 
persisted in refusing to define a "heavy" missile The U S effort to reduce 
the Soviet land-based missile threat by moving part of it to sea (in keeping 
with the U S definition of stability) was partially successful with a rather 
complicated trade-off formula which stipulated that maximum numbers of SLBMs 
could be attained only if prescribed numbers of "old” ICBMs were 
dismantled/destroyed Although some critics have charged that the price the
U S paid for agreement on the SLBM/ICBM problem was excessive (it allows the 
U S S R  substantially more ICBM/SLBM launchers than the U S )— President Nixon 
did not agree 29 Agreement had been reached but methods and issues which arose 
in SALT I had repercussions still felt today
In international political terms SALT I was a success It was successful 
in that it showed that the disparate political views of the U S and Soviet 
Union could, at least in a small way, be jointly accommodated It was 
successful in creating a political investment by both sides in avoiding steps
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that could jeopardize future negotiations, and by at least implying that 
modernization of strategic arsenals (within treaty constraints) was permissible 
and not inconsistent with future agreements As an "arms control" treaty it was 
less successful but arguably could be seen as a useful, incremental step It 
did little to resolve important strategic concerns on both sides, nor did it 
effect a reduction in nuclear arsenals It did, however, limit potential growth 
in some important areas, e g , total launchers, and served the important 
function of codifying the "rules of the game" for future negotiations In 
short, the merit of SALT I was no£ meaningful arms control, the merit lay in the 
nature of a "political promissory note" to continue the dialogue within some 
recognizable framework As the U S maneuvered through the negotiations of SALT 
I, however, it became more apparent that new organizations and methods were 
playing a role in the negotiations
While not a "new" organization, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) underwent significant change in focus and power between its inception in 
1961 and the final agreements in SALT I As was mentioned before ACDA was to be 
the primary agency in the quest for arms control However, by 1968 ACDA had 
evolved, or devolved depending on one's viewpoint, to a staff agency normally 
represented as only one of the members of various interagency groups designed to 
reach a consensus position for presentation to senior national security 
officials In short SALT policy was fast becoming an ad hoc arrangement 
Although the reasons for the decline in the fortunes of ACDA are outside the 
purview of this discussion, John Newhouse noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) thought ACDA "a collection of ritual disarmers "30 The JCS, as an 
essential body to treaty acceptance, if not ratification, were, without doubt, a 
force with which to be concerned As the Nixon administration took office, SALT
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policy, while still subject in some degree to ad hoc committees, was drawn under 
closer control by the White House Superficially, ACDA, and its Director Gerard 
Smith, appeared to regain some lost ground in terms of bureaucratic power 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)-28 called for ACDA to undertake a 
study of various SALT options and outline the strategic, political and 
verification aspects of any potential agreement 3* official dissatisfaction 
with that report led to the establishment of two new panels created to deal with 
MIRV and verification issues According to Newhouse the creation of the 
verification panel, to be chaired by Dr Kissinger, was the key organizational 
move which placed the White House in control of SALT, removed ACDA from the 
center of SALT planning, mollified the JCS and perhaps most importantly, 
determined political direction from the top down, which ostensibly reduced 
bureaucratic infighting in the forging of a consensus 32
As the bureaucracy reorganized for consensus, the constitutional actor in 
the treaty-making process— Congress— began to play a more active role It is 
probably safe to say that, with the exception of a minor interest in issues 
pertinent to arms control displayed by congressional committees, Congress played 
a minimal role in the SALT process prior to 1972 In May 1972, Congress became 
directly involved in the SALT process both through its role as the ratifying 
body of treaties and the requirements for congressional cognizance by the Arras 
Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 Further, Congress established the 
precedent whereby congressional "guidance" was to be a factor in arms control 
negotiations of the future The first instance of such "guidance" was H J Res 
1227 which became Public Law 92-448 on 30 September 1972 Better known as the 
"Jackson Amendment" it effectively became a congressional mandate to adopt a 
policy of numerical equality as one of the basic parameters of arms control
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efforts with the Soviet Union Moreover, it established as U S law a policy of 
equivalence by declaring that neither the U S nor the Soviet Union should seek 
unilateral advantage 33 Congress had begun to "stake out its turf" as momentum 
began to build for SALT II
SALT I had obvious shortcomings It failed to arrest the growth of ICBM 
warheads through MIRVing, it put off the issue of cruise missiles, and it 
highlighted differing approaches to negotiation by the two superpowers without 
significant effort to reconcile those differences by either side It was at 
best partial arms limitation To condemn it for its lack of comprehensive 
limits or failure to reduce arsenals is, however, to lose sight of its merit as 
a step in the reduction of tension between the U S and the Soviet Union It 
did offer limits on ABM deployment, essentially freeze ballistic missile 
launcher levels, offer two agreements which, while not central to strategic arms 
limits, could be of invaluable aid to management of future crises, establish a 
formal commission to resolve disputes over treaty interpretation, and reveal 
that both sides had at least some common interest in the maintenance of a stable 
relationship It was not disarmament, it was not comprehensive arms reduction, 
it was limited arms control It was yet another step in what could only be 
viewed as an incremental process aimed at reducing tension and distrust between 
the superpowers If the agreement failed to live up to expectations, perhaps it 
was because too much was expected of it SALT II was to attempt to do 
everything that SALT I failed to do and after seven years of negotiation 
received, at best, mixed reviews for its results
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II
What Happened 9
By 1979, the proposed SALT II Treaty did it all and did nothing, it was 
disarmament and rearmament, it exacerbated existing imbalances and achieved 
equal levels of arms —  it was too much and too little Conservative leaders 
saw the growth in Soviet military power in conventional weapons, shorter range 
nuclear systems (e g , the "Backfire" bomber and SS-20 missiles) and naval 
forces as well as those systems covered by SALT II as a clarion call for 
rearmament Liberal leaders were also critical of SALT II because it ostensibly 
allowed too much room for both sides to continue the arms race After almost 
seven years of negotiation under three U S presidents, both sides'agreed to and 
signed the SALT II treaty How then did such a prolonged effort negotiated by 
representatives of Republican and Democratic administrations result in a treaty 
which drew criticism across the political spectrum? There have been literally 
thousands of pages of books, congressional testimony and debate, newspaper 
articles and editorials as well as seemingly endless hours of television 
programming dedicated to a step-by-step rehash of those years of negotiation and 
debate It would, therefore, serve little purpose to recapitulate them here 
During those years of negotiation, two events do stand out as turning polilts in
the process the latter of which may have marked the beginning of SALT II's slide 
into limbo
In November 1974, the negotiations were at a standstill when President Ford 
and Secretary Brezhnev met in Vladivostok The groundwork had been carefully 
laid by the respective delegations, but the full weight of a meeting between 
chiefs of state during which both sides subscribed to a framework within which
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future negotiations were to take place cannot be underestimated That 
framework, a common ceiling of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles (SNDV) of which 
no more than 1320 could be MIRVed served as "marching orders" for the 
delegations until the spring of 1977 In March 1977, it seemed that both sides 
were moving toward agreement when the Carter administration forwarded its "Deep 
Cuts" proposal The proposal sought to modify and broaden the charter of the 
Vladivostok accord It sought to reduce the overall SNDV count from 2400 to 
1800-2000, the sub ceiling on MIRV launchers from 1320 to 1100-1200, set a new 
sub ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs at 550, reduce Soviet heavy missiles, set limits on 
ICBM flight testing and ban development, testing and deployment of any new ICBM 
While disavowing any intent to repudiate previous SALT agreements or the 
Vladivostok accord, the Carter administration had done just that Soviet 
reaction was predictable Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called the proposal 
a cheap and shady maneuver" and refused to make a Soviet counter offer 
Whether or not the mission of Secretary Cyrus Vance to forward the "Deep Cuts" 
proposal was directly responsible for the two more years of negotiation that 
were to follow is debatable —  that by any measure the mission was a diplomatic 
disaster is not In one case bilateral agreement on the part of two heads of 
state appeared to break the deadlock, in the other a unilateral movement served 
to call further attention to the inconsistency inherent in the U S SALT policy 
process 1
Finally, on 18 June 1979, President Carter and Party Chairman Brezhnev 
signed the "Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," known as SALT II The treaty and its 
attendant documents— the protocol, the Soviet unilateral Backfire statement and 
the principles of conduct for future negotiations— had been concluded, but the
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fight had just begun
The treaty itself „as a box within a box, within a box, within a box 
insofar as strategic delivery vehicles or launchers were concerned Each side 
could have 2400 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) which were to be 
reduced to no tore than 2250 within one year of entry into force of the treaty
first consider article III paragraph 1 U í t .  which are predicated upon "entry 
into force" or ratification) Out of the total u í t  of SNDVs no »ore than 1320 
could be MIRVed launchers (ICBMs. SLBMs and cruise »issile carrying bo»bers) 
Within the total MIRV U í t  no »ore than 1200 launchers could be MIRVed ICBMs 
and SLBMs, and finally out of the 1200, no »ore than 820 could be MIRVed ICBMs 
la addition, certain qualitative constraints were placed upon strategic forces 
No new fixed ICBM launchers were to be built, existing launchers could not be 
relocated, "light" ICBMs could not be converted to "heavy" ICBMs, and »obile 
launchers for heavy ICBMs were prohibited Further, li»its were placed on 
enlargement of missile silos, modernisation of older ICBMs launchwexght and 
throwweight limits were placed on "heavy" ICBMs and fractionation limits were
imposed on existing and future types of ICBMs SLUM*
IV or JXiJMs, SLBMs and cruise missile carrying
heavy bombers 2
Measures were also taken to enhance the capability of the two signatories 
bo verify the provisions of the treaty Both sides were to provxde a data base 
on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and the various subcategories, that 
data base was to be monitored by the Standing Consultative Commission and 
updated twice a year There were provisions which banned encryption of test 
data which would interfere with national technical means (NTM) of verification 
provided for a system of identification for these systems which were MIRVed but
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bore resemblance to un-MIRVed systems (e g functionally related observable
differences on cruise missile carriers) and prohibited -deliberate concealment"
to improve verification Also included were -confidence building measures"
such as prior notification of missile test launches, ostensibly aimed at aiding
verification and avoiding the possibility that a test launch could be mistaken 
for hostile action
"Grey areas" were put off into the protocol (expiration date, 31 December 
1981) either to be discussed later or placed in the "too tough to handle" file 
The protocol banned for its duration deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, 
prohibited flight testing and deployment of air-to-surface ICBMs and prohibited 
deployment of long-range (in excess of 600 km ) cruise missiles on land or 
sea-based launchers In addition, testing of cruise missiles with multiple 
independently targetable warheads from land or sea-based launchers was 
prohibited The final grey area -  the "Backfire" bomber -  „as relegated to a 
third document called simply the "Soviet Backfire Statement " m  that statement 
the Soviet Onion pledged not to give the Backfire the capability of 
intercontinental strikes nor to produce at a rate exceeding the then current 
rate of 30 per year Resolution of the issues in the protocol and the pursuit 
of further talks and reductions was the announced goal of the statement of 
principles for further negotiations
The treaty, with agreed statements, common understandings, etc is a 
document of some fifty-odd pages, carefully constructed, patiently negotiated, 
signed by two heads of state and submitted to the U S Senate for its advice and 
consent on ratification For all of that it apparently failed miserably l„ 
the words of the proverbial man on the street -  "What happened’"
The SALT IX debate during the last years of negotiation and ratification
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process took two fores -  those which centered on technical issues and those 
Which attacked or defended the treaty on political grounds The technical 
issues of verification, Soviet "heavy" ICBMs, "new types" of !CBMs and cruise 
missiles (deployment and range) were the most often mentioned 3  Typlcal of the
comments of those critical of the treaty testifying before Congress were those 
of Lt Gen Edward Rowney
-V, c 4 treaty is ““equal It grants certain rights to 
the Soviet Union and not to us Two of these
inequalities are of cardinal importance First the 308
thpnn n ^ SH°Q heaVy ICBMS Permitted the U S S R but not 
:ateS* and the Second» the exclusion of 3 7 5  Soviet Backfire Bombers from the Soviet aggregates *
General Rowney also addressed inequalities in ICBM and SLBM warheads and the 
cruise missile questions
»ff» M  aVerage SLBM Warhead 1 3  only one fortieth as
ICBM and^ R i / “ I“ M .warehead one should not countICBM and SLBM warheads as though they were equal There
are a host of other inequities in the treaty 
limitations on cruise missiles constrain only U S
systems Another inequality resulted from the”
inciusion of aircraft equipped for air launched cruise 
missiles in the 1320 aggregate 5
Finally, on the subject of verifiability,General Rowney stated
^ r i f ^ T / 8  n0t weri£iable «F assessment of
lonîf ?l U íy reStS f°r the “osl: Part not on the monitoring but on the unsatisfactory provisions of the
/ s  s T r lf ï° Whl?h the monlt°ring applies The 
n e c e s s a r i  a°nsiste“tly re£used to agree to provisiot 
?rnw ¡i™, 4  e adaquate verification of mobile
s, IRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, new types of ICBMs hea\ 
bombers and cruise missiles 6  ’
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During the negotiation of SALT II General Rowney was the representative of
Che J°lnt Chiefs of Staff to the SALT delegation Compare the testimony above
wifh the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States 
Air Force General David C Jones
None of us (the JCS) is „holly at ease with all aspects
s Î v ï e t ' ^ T 6^  and 311 0f us are ‘»“cerned about the retention of 308 modern large ballistic
missiles, the SS-18, and the exclusion of the Backfire 
Bomber from the aggregate totals of strategic nuclear
'hicheverïficati8 *  ?ls° ack“°wlad*c thS chaUe^ge“  1 requirements will pose as well as our
« s s  -
monf Ce/ooneonceaiment measures for our monitoring of Soviet capabilities
thebS ^ T CII avr *** J?lnt ChiefS °f Staff concluded that the SALT II agreement is a modest but useful sten m  »
long range process which must include-------rj.„P , -
capabilities to maintain strategic balance Und]
(emphasis°added)0rtS “  aChiSVe substantial eductions 7
Further delineation of the differences between those divided on technical issues 
is not necessary here Suffice it to say that opinion was and is sharply 
divided with both sides of the question able to make reasonable arguments for 
their respective cases It was not, however, on the basis of technical 
arguments that SALT II was eventually withdrawn from consideration for 
ratification It died of political strangulation
The facts are fairly simple Ratification of a treaty requires two-thirds 
of the Senate to vote favorably Therefore a minority of only thirty-four may 
prevent a treaty from coming into force One could examine thousands of Senate
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votes on issues far less substantial and/or controversial and find very few 
which commanded a two-thirds majority But SALT II had been the subject of 
public debate for several years Former Secretary of State Kissinger observed
thf  ln the Spring °f 1974 • SALT became the whipping boy in a more fundamental philosophical
contest over East-West relations For its notaries sait 
turned into an end in itself, for its opponents I t  ¿as a 
o a « erft0 c°mbatted at any cost SALT was no longer a
s t r a t i  £? tl' COheyent sec“tity policy or an ov5r.ll strategy Thrust upon itself, it became an orphan and a
victim, ground down between liberal idealism and a 
conservative dogmatism unleavened by a sense of 
proportion or strategy 8
While Secretary Kissinger noted the battle over SALT in 1974, the debate became 
even more acrimonious as the summer of 1979 approached In short -  SALT II 
faced an overwhelming ratification fight Not only was the basic arithmetic 
against it, but it served as a political scapegoat upon which the "failures" of 
detente, the recent American setback in Iran, and the perceived lack of 
confidence in President Carter as a tough and shrewd dealer with the Soviet 
Union could be heaped For all of the opposition from liberals and 
conservatives, from members of Congress and interest groups, and arms 
controllers and advocates of rearmament it appeared that a promise to increase 
defense budgets and continue to pursue further arms talks by the Carter 
administration might just push SALT II into force The fatal blows came with 
the controversy which surrounded the "Cuban Brigade" and, in December of 1979, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Shortly thereafter, in January 1980, 
President Carter asked the Senate to cease to consider the ratification of SALT 
XI issues which were tangential to the treaty itself did more to doom SALT II 
than any lack of perspicacity on the part of the negotiators or inability of the
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language of the treaty itself to deal with the issues of strategic ants 
limitation
Briefly, those „ho opposed SALT II maintained that the treaty „as 
Inequitable and unverifiable Those charges „ere ans„ered and to a large extent 
Proponents of the treaty „ere not able to adequately counter the 
charges that SALT II legitimated the Soviet build-up in strategic arms, and that 
by doing so prevented the U S from -catching up- (or regaining its former 
position) Finally and most damning, at least from the standpoint of rhetorical 
urish, SALT II lulled the U S into a false sense of security which resulted 
m  a -decade of neglect" and opened a "„indo» of vulnerability -
SALT II continues to be a study in contradiction No one really likes it 
but every one seemed to be in favor of progress in arms control It couldn't be 
ratified in 1979 or even in 1984 but at least until its programmed expiration 
date of 31 December 1985 both the U S and Soviet Union continue to observe it 
Those „ho campaigned against it as -fatally fla„ed" continue to advise President 
Reagan that it is in the best interest of the nation to abide by the treaty 
limits and follo» the preserved procedures for addressing detected or suspected 
Soviet violations as if the treaty had indeed been ratified The paradox of 
such a situation could bring one to many different conclusions Ho„ever. at 
least t„o seem obvious First, both parties are refraining from blatantly 
undercutting the agreement because it follo„s fairly closely the outlines of 
strategic programs planned by the t„o sides and adherence appears to be in their 
best interest Second, the failure of ratification in the United States „as 
more a result of political symbolism and domestic political considerations than 
of any shortcomings of the treaty The question for consideration of SALT II 
should have been Are „e better off „ith the treaty than „ithout it? The
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answer would then have been obvious Were it not so would we now, five years 
later, still be observing its provisions7
There are questions, central to arms control, which must be answered in the 
1980s and beyond if the U S  is to pursue any reasonable national security 
policy First and foremost Is arms control a practical exercise7 If the 
answer is no, further comment is superfluous If yes, the next question has to 
consider how to proceed in the negotiations just resumed To even begin to 
consider the answer, examination of the process, the players and approaches is 
called for
Policy and "Style"
During the last two decades the U S has experienced evolutionary and 
revolutionary change in its arms control apparatus With the foundation of ACDA 
under the Kennedy administration the stage was set for the creation of a "new" 
system for dealing with the issues of arms control As the Johnson 
administration initiated the preliminary processes which were to eventually lead 
to discussions with the Soviet Union under the Nixon administration, the 
existing bureaucracy of those agencies concerned primarily with national 
security matters was seen as sufficient to deal with arras control The existing 
interagency machinery consisted of ACDA, staff elements of the Department of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department and CIA In addition a 
committee of principals served as the senior coordinating committee on arms 
control matters As the summer of 1968 drew closer and it became more apparent 
that the Soviet Union might be interested in negotiations, the formal apparatus 
was largely supplanted by ad hoc arrangements Most notable of these was a 
group simply known as "the SALT committee " The bureaucratic maneuvering that
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“ “  b’ "  ■“  " a/“  “ • ' ° ™ 1 *. ... «........ * „  I0
“ “  .... ... I.C.1 point tor »  ....... , u» pcesidenc, ... l.w ,
• ......... to. R, rh., ....... tIC
.......... U W ’ < « .  .... .......... o o m . . .
t. ul.ina cel, C  p,....... ,o. „„
g me It seems almost superfluous to note that the aforementioned 
method was largely ineffectual
By way of contrast, revolutionary changes in the arms control apparatus
Came ln the NiXO“ SALT planning was under the direct control of
the White House through the National Security Council system According to the
Newhouse account, the key move leading to White House control was the creation
Verification Panel and its associated working group for the study of both 
the strategic Implications of SALT and its verification problems 10 The 
creation of the panel, chaired by Henry Kissinger, did several things It 
established a central control point over the planning for SALT and it removed 
what had already been described as a suspect agency (ACDA) from the central 
Planning function I„ addition, it created a highly structured system for the 
solicitation of analytical work on pollcy/negotlatlng alternatives while 
reserving the final decisionmaking power, and. although by implication only, it 
sent the message to the bureaucracies Involved that direction from the top d o ™  
was expected to expedite the policy consensus and avoid lengthy infighting Dr 
Kissinger was quoted as saying that the verification panel had -virtually 
eliminated the narrow adversary approach to arms limitation hitherto practiced 
within the U S government, which used to provoke bitter intramural
............. ^
......1 ami «h.
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between Kissinger and Dobrynin remained through the Nixon and Ford 
administrations One may endlessly debate the merits of a tight, centralized 
system such as the one described in a democratic society but there is ample 
evidence that the system offered advantages in bilateral talks between the U S 
and Soviet Union not found in its predecessor
The Carter administration moved away from the centralized system evident in 
the Nixon—Ford years but attempted to stop short of the far looser arrangements 
found in the Kennedy-Johnson periods President Carter placed more emphasis on 
a "team effort" and seemingly preferred that no one person become the focal 
point for matters of national security policy and/or arms control that Kissinger 
had been While it is undeniable that a major influence was National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the particular authority that had been held by 
Kissinger was spread among others including the Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defense, Director of ACDA and the CIA Director 12 Although not dissimilar in 
structure from the Kennedy-Johnson years an important difference lay in the role 
of the National Security Advisor as a sort of referee who could impose some 
order on a group of bureaucratic "equals " Conversely, there was no dominant 
figure as the framer of policy The "team" approach apparently was functional 
but after the aforementioned diplomatic disaster of Secretary Vance's mission in 
1977 the impression of unanimity began to disappear Additionally, as was 
previously discussed, there was little evidence that the "team" regained its 
ability to reconcile disparate views For example, the chief U S negotiator 
and director of ACDA, Paul Warnke, "resigned" just prior to the conclusion of 
SALT II, indicating if nothing else, the dissension within the administration's 
"team "
During the first four years of the Reagan administration there was little
46
indication that the structure of the arms control bureaucracy differed 
significantly from that under Carter To be sure the personalities were 
different but it is reasonably safe to assert that given two Secretaries of 
State and as many National Security Advisors and two chiefs of ACDA and a change 
in the chief of the START delegation that no one personality or group has 
asserted the influence attributed to Kissinger during the Nixon era
Concomitant with the changes m  administration style or organization in 
dealing with the issues of arms control were changes in congressional attitudes 
and action as well As has been previously discussed, by the end of SALT I and 
as SALT II was being negotiated, Congress was "staking out its turf" in the arms 
control arena The Jackson amendment effectively restricted the focus of future 
negotiations to those which resulted in numerically equal force levels Beyond 
the Jackson amendment, however, other congressional responses to Soviet American 
relations in general and arms control in particular could be construed as 
disruptive rather than purposeful or constructive In 1973, the Nixon 
administration proposed to grant to the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
trade status But Senator Jackson successfully garnered a sufficiently strong 
coalition to amend the bilateral trade agreement and make it contingent upon the 
removal of Soviet barriers to Jewish immigration The Soviets predictably 
renounced the agreement as undue interference in Soviet internal affairs 13 
Congress also reacted to restrict the use of other politico-military instruments 
of competition with the Soviet Union The story is too familiar to bear 
repeating here, but the 1973 votes against involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia, 
prevention of an increase in American aid to Angola, congressional oscillation 
on grain trade issues, requirements that CIA operations be discussed by six 
different congressional committees and allocation of U S food exports to
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countries of "greatest need," did little to enhance the ability of either the 
Nixon or Ford administration to prosecute a coherent, consistent foreign policy 
On an even broader scale Secretary Kissinger observed that no large percentage 
of Congress placed a high value on the maintenance of good U S -Soviet relations 
when he noted "Liberals took the relaxation of tensions for granted while 
conservatives assailed it 14
In addition, it may reasonably be asserted that much of the congressional 
activity to reassert itself in the foreign policy arena was in reaction to the 
"imperial presidency" and "close hold" attitude of Nixon and Kissinger Perhaps 
in response to the less communicative style just attributed to the Nixon 
administration or perhaps as a result of the apparent distrust of the efficacy 
of military planners which grew out of the Vietnam era, Congress took additional 
steps in 1975 to increase its influence on arms control efforts By amending 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to add section 36, Congress required that 
Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) be submitted along with the budget 
requests for certain weapons systems It was thought that the statements would 
be of value in assessing the potential impact of nuclear armament and technology 
programs on arms control policy and negotiations Section 36 was further 
amended in 1978 to require earlier submission and^ the release of unclassified 
statements to the general public By the spring of 1980 Congress was obviously 
less than satisfied with what it considered unwarranted delays in the submission 
of the required assessments and chided the executive branch Representative 
Zablocki and Senator Church stated
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these delays deprive Congress of the basic 
information it needs to assess the impact of major 
nuclear and defense programs affecting arms control 
policy and negotiations and our country's security We 
fully expect that future submissions of ACIS will be 
in full compliance with section 36 of the arms control 
and disarmament act 15
Most certainly, if it were not abundantly clear before, both houses of Congress 
had served notice that they were factors in the arms control equation —  from 
the force planning stage, through the budget and negotiation processes —  as 
well as the constitutional vehicle (for the Senate) for ratification
Sufficient space here and elsewhere has already been devoted to the 
acrimony of debate over the Carter administration foreign policy and its shifts 
and the debate over SALT II Suffice it to say that the evidence is reasonably 
clear that moderates in both parties were becoming suspect as Congress sought to 
make itself a primary force in foreign policy making It appears that the 
single most successful tactic so far in efforts to deal with the "new" influence 
evident in the extremes of both political parties is to confuse the opposition 
by doing the opposite of what might be expected on ideological grounds Senator 
William Cohen (R-Maine) explained the "paradox" most cogently when he said
conservative republican presidents (moderates or 
liberals need not apply) may be able to open doors to 
China and secure support for arms control treaties yet be 
unable to sustain a significant or even stable growth in 
military spending By contrast, liberal or moderate 
democratic presidents may be able to secure support for 
strategic and conventional modernization (few questioned 
the need for MX, Stealth aircraft, Trident submarines, or 
a rapid deployment force under Jimmy Carter) but will be 
less able to obtain ratification of arras control 
treaties 16
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The resurgence of Congress has served as, at least, a complicating factor in the 
pursuit of arms control as a feature of foreign and national security policy 
The changes in Congress might well be traced to the impact or potential for 
impact found in those extra-governmental influences collectively known as 
"public opinion "
To state that the rise in impact of public opinion upon the governmental 
conduct of foreign policy could be directly correlated to the increased 
capability of modern society to communicate through various media would seem to 
be obvious The increased access of a society to the proceedings of government 
and its concomitant increased ability to communicate with government would make 
a marked rise in its potential impact virtually inevitable Also notable is the 
increased visibility of special interest groups and/or political action 
committees It is immaterial whether the groups themselves are multi-issue 
groups such as those that represent "business interests" or single-issue groups 
such as the "nuclear freeze campaign"— all are undeniably more visible and 
therefore potentially more influential Diversity of opinion and the ability of 
a populace to communicate with their elected representatives are vital 
ingredients in a democracy* Also inherent in a democracy is the requirement to 
recognize that reasonable people can and do disagree on issues However, to 
suggest that increasingly visible and vocal groups have little or no impact on 
the foreign policy process is to fail to recognize them for the complicating 
factor they have become Public officers engaged in policy formulation have 
found themselves under attack from both sides and inevitably find themselves in 
a position which effectively restricts the range in which they may exercise 
foreign policy (and by implication, arms control) options, given that narrow
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range and the diverse issues and associated opinions Public officers are given 
the ultimate criteria for any policy maker —  results alone count —  if one 
could figure out what results are desired it would be simple
Security and Arras Control7
There is finally one group of arms control actors loosely characterized as 
the "Pentagon," which by most accounts includes the Department of Defense staff, 
the JCS and staff, the staff of the military branches, the intelligence 
community, and components of other agencies as appropriate Contained within 
that amorphous mass collectively known as the "Pentagon" or "military community" 
are those policy makers and planners charged with the task of maintaining the 
forces and programs to guarantee national security In addition to the expected 
pressures from the various governmental actions and extra governmental 
influences, the planners are faced with additional dilemmas, not the least of 
which has been termed the "strategy-capabilities" mismatch In recent years as 
the Soviet Union undertook an unprecedented military buildup, modernization and 
improvement program the U S sought as well to change its nuclear strategy from 
an avowed policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, to flexible response to the 
"controlling" strategy implicit in Presidential Directive (PD) 59 The final 
shift, one which is the most demanding militarily, essentially formalized the 
long developing shift in nuclear strategy toward more flexible attack options 
It was described by then Defense Secretary Brown as establishing targeting 
objectives for selective attacks against Soviet military targets, Soviet 
military and political leadership, and the Soviet industrial and economic base 
It also called for a secure strategic reserve to carry out the assured 
destruction role, if required 17 To assess the impact of such a call for
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Increased flexibility, survivability and accuracy one must remember that the 
last major improvement in the then extant strategic arsenal was the deployment 
of the MM III with its complement of three MIRVs In short, policy was changed 
and force structure and concomitant targeting philosophy were expected to "catch 
up " The implications for the military planner, be he a targeter or force 
structure planner, are obvious The rush to close the "policy-practice" 
mismatch creates pressure for "quick fixes" which may result in what could best 
be described as a patch-work force structure ill-suited to future challenges
Combined with the pressures mentioned above, an era of increasingly scarce 
resources in which competition for budget allocations is keen can lead to a 
search for "force multipliers " That is, the need to exploit a given, available 
or nearly available technology in order to "bridge the gap" can give rise to 
what could be termed a "technological imperative" —  "we can, therefore we 
must " Having pursued or been pursued by the "technological imperative" and 
developed a "force multiplier" the military planner is then faced with a 
phenomenon that apparently gives an ongoing program a life of its own, even if 
the original purpose for the program disappears or a calmer, more dispassionate 
view later questions its utility For example, as was previously discussed, 
policy makers and military planners saw the deployment of Soviet ABM as a threat 
to the penatrativity of Ü S ICBM warheads and sought to overwhelm that defense 
with the technology of MIRV In the absence of extensive Soviet defenses, e g , 
constraint extant in the ABM treaty, one would have expected at least the 
partial abandonment of MIRV As the U S continued its pursuit of MIRV 
technology the Soviet Union quickly followed suit and extensive developments on 
both sides undoubtedly contributed to the inability of arms control negotiators 
to adequately address the issue later More recently the "technological
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imperative" operated on cruise missiles, especially the sea-launched version 
Faced with a continuing Soviet build-up and a mismatch in requirements and 
capability, the U S carefully protected its option to deploy long-range 
sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) during SALT II 18 It would appear almost; 
axiomatic now that a capability possessed by our side can or will be matched by 
the other, in fact, a short-range SLCM had been deployed by the Soviet Union by 
197619 and longer-range versions are apparently on the way if not deployed 
already
Nonetheless, SLCMs, having been deployed, and now being improved by both 
sides, present considerable problems to verification In addition, despite the 
apparent lead of the United States in cruise missile technology it is evident 
that the "technological imperative" has taken precedence over careful 
consideration of the strategic implications of such systems For example, one 
need only glance at a map to notice that the U S is a relatively small land 
mass, surrounded on three sides by ice-free ocean, make a quick comparison with 
the Soviet Union, and decide which is more vulnerable to a SLCM threat
The threat and its assessment gives rise to the most contentious issues 
confronted by the military planner He is asked to provide an accurate 
assessment of a potential enemy's arsenal, then in keeping with other 
assumptions of deterrent theory, assume that the opponent intends to use that 
arsenal (if there were no W e n t  then no need to deter would exist), and propose 
a force structure and strategy to counter both the "capability" and "intent "
In short, "worst case" analysis is the only alternative The "worst case" is, 
however, far from clear One need only to turn to today's newspaper to focus 
upon the varying assessments of an indisputably large Soviet military 
establishment Add to that a history of miscalculations such as the famous
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"bomber gap" or "missile gap" of late 5(Ts and early 6(Ts and one begins to 
realize the contradictory pressures faced by the military planner The 
foregoing is not an indictment of intelligence sources or those charged with 
planning future force structures It is intended to bring to light what should 
be the obvious fact that military planners in the face of pressure to meet a 
burgeoning threat, obtain a bridge for the strategy-capabilities mismatch, 
reduce the budget, maintain deterrence, control the growth of nuclear arsenals 
without compromising the security of the United States, and implement a 
targeting strategy today with forces that may not be in position for ten years, 
if ever, are under strong counter pressures which are often inimicable to a 
flexible negotiating position on arms control Those pressures become more 
obvious when one considers some of the various options offered as the 
"preferred" approach to a partnership between national security and arms 
control
The "Preferred" Approach
There exists within and outside government a number of constituencies 
advocating different approaches to arms control The most popular of these may 
be grouped into two general categories with two sub-categories the "freeze" 
approach, and the more traditional "limits and ceilings " Within the latter one 
could reasonably accommodate "build-down" and/or "trade-off" approaches Of 
those mentioned the one that has seemingly captured the public imagination is 
the "nuclear freeze "
There are many freeze proposals in circulation and they have surfaced in 
various guises as referendums at state and local governmental levels The 
largest and most vital segment of the movement is that which supports an
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"Immediate freeze - An indiate freeze is usualiy characterized as a halt to 
the "Production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapon systems -20 The 
freeze is not a new idea One could find its roots in the Eisenhower 
administration with various proposals and more specifically as a U S position 
in the 1960s Pressent Johnson proposed in 1964 a freeze on offensive and 
defensive nuclear systems and was reacted by the Soviet Union 2! The Baruch 
Plan could have heen considered a form of freeze, most arms control proposals 
could have heen termed a freeze of sorts However, an the terms in which the 
proposal is most often stated currently, none save the Baruch plan approach its 
comprehensive nature That single characteristic has most probably been the 
cause for its relative lack of consistency in interpretation and somewhat 
diffuse impact upon the governments it seeks to influence Perhaps the best 
example of its varying interpretations and diffuse impact can be seen in the 
debate and subsequent passage of House Joint Resolution - 13 l„ „hac was
reportedly the longest debate on any single issue in the history of the house 
the much amended resolution finally paSsed by a vote of 278 to 149 The vote 
however reflected more a "something for everyone" resolution than concrete 
support for a freeze For example, HJ-13 calls for » a muCual and
verifiable freeze on_and reductions in nuclear weapons (emphasis added) " Ie 
also allows that "n0£hlng in thls re3olutlon ^  ^  ^
the United States from taking advantage of concurrent and complementary arms 
proposals (nor) prevent whatever modernization and
„.„o. _ intun
of ... UolCod Sfate, ..cl.., a...,..« - „  [h>
taaolutloo «... m  ^
dellvac, th„ , „  u  ^  .
!
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Section 13 posits that both sides will have equal levels of forces in accordance 
with the previously discussed Jackson amendment The final thaw in the freeze
is contained in Section 15 which states simply -any item both sides do not 
agree to freeze mould not be frozen -22 whatever nerlts ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
an agreement are overcome by the obvious contradictions inherent in the only
resolution to successfully pass even one house of Congress, not to mention the
difficulties of negotiating an agreement or planning and force structure with
such nebulous instructions All-encompassing approaches to arms control whether
they be the current -freeze- or its predecessors had little success in the past
and as exemplified in HJ-13 offer little in the way of hope for the future
There are, however, methods by which reductions may be accomplished that are not
only more politically acceptable, but more clearly defined and therefore more 
possible
The more traditional limits and/or ceilings approach offers an opportunity 
to build up historical precedent and has the advantage of defining or 
delineating categories on specific weapons systems to be limited or reduced In 
contrast to the freeze approach it offers considerably more flexibility to 
accommodate variances in force structures and/or deterrent philosophies Limits 
and ratios were present in the Washington naval treaties More recently, and 
because of time, perhaps more importantly the two superpowers have at least 
tacitly codified an approach which uses limits, sublimits and/or ceilings For 
example, both sides agreed to ceilings on overall strategic force structures in 
SALT II, and on ballistic missile defenses in the ABM treaty Additionally 
there were limits on numbers of ICBMs and ballistic missile carrying submarines 
in SALT I as well as on total numbers of warheads which may be deployed on 
MIRVed ballistic missiles (fractionation) in SALT II One can readily see the
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diverse nature of potential categories and therefore the «ore inherent 
flexibility of the limits and ceilings approach Moreover, the previously 
mentioned approaches of "build-down" and/or "trade off" which could not be 
accommodated within a freeze adapt readily to limits and/or ceilings
Build-down can best be described as a guaranteed reduction by requiring 
that modernized systems be deployed in lesser numbers than their predecessors 
That could be accomplished by a ratio system which requires that one replace at 
a greater than 1 1 ratio old warheads and/or systems for newer, or that
overall/specific percentages of the systems/warheads described in the limits 
and/or ceilings be reduced at regular (e g , annual, biannually, etc ) 
intervals In short, build-down may be based upon traditional approaches and 
paced by the modernization program of the two sides, by regular reductions or by 
a combination of the two The advantages offered in long-range planning and 
negotiating flexibility are undeniably greater than those offered by a freeze 
In like manner, a trade-off approach is compatible with limits and ceilings, 
moreover it may also be integrated with build-down Trade-off approaches also 
have the flexibility to accommodate force structure assymetries in various ways 
For example, SALT I allowed trade-off, within certain parameters, in systems 
from those seen as less stabilizing to those seen as more stabilizing, i e , 
ICBMs could be dismantled to increase the numbers of SLBMs that could be 
deployed In addition trade-offs can be used to trade existing advantages on 
one side for advantages possessed by the other The difficulties in ascribing 
relative values to those assymmetries arise when one considers the variables of 
basing, vulnerability to defensive measures and survivability Those problems 
notwithstanding, trade-off approaches may have some merit
The foregoing discussion, albeit brief, of the historical experience,
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differing philosophies, participants and their varying impact, and the currently 
popular approaches in the area of arms control is of little practical use unless 
some conclusions are forthcoming The current debate over the most reasonable 
or "negotiable" approach to arms control seems to focus on a single aspect or 
another of the total picture Military balances are argued, negotiating 
positions are applauded or denigrated, and proposed national security strategies 
(and by implication the force structures to support them) each have their 
vociferous and eloquent advocates What seems to be missing, however, is a 
clear appreciation for the need for a strategy which deals effectively with 
these obstacles to a genuine partnership between national security and arms 
control which are present domestically The controversies surrounding the most
recent developments in the START negotiations and the events surrounding them 
seem a logical point of departure
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III
A New "stapt11
As the Reagan administration forwarded Its first START proposai in June 
1982 it called for "substantial, eatable and verifiable reductions " The 
proposal called for a two-phase approach which called for li„its 0n 
"fast-flying," .ore "destabilising" syste.s such as ICBMs as a first step toward 
»ore comprehensive agreement to be negotiated in the second phase As a logical 
outgrowth of what was seen as major shortcomings in SALT II, that is, failure to 
overcome the unilateral right of the Soviet Union to maintain over 300 "Heavy 
ICBMs" and the failure to limit the number of warheads permitted each side, the 
proposal called for reductions in total numbers of ballistic missile warheads to 
no more than 5000 of which only 2500 could be on ICBMs m  addition it would 
require that both sides reduce the total number of deployed ballistic missiles 
(ICBM and SLBM) to no more than 850 The "slower flying," "less destabilizing" 
systems such as bombers and cruise missiles were to be discussed at a later date 
with the number of bombers most often mentioned being 400
Major criticisms of the proposal surfaced almost at once from the Soviets 
as well as domestic sources The most common charges were that the proposal was 
one-sided by focusing on ballistic missiles (the mainstay of Soviet strategic
th* s ” " ‘  "■“ » «  . . .
that it excluded bombers and cruise missiles from limitation After a year of 
negotiations, during which the Soviets had made little in the way of a 
constructive counter proposal, the administration began to modify its stance 1
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in July 1983, a modified U S proposal was announced which was designed to 
alleviate the concerns expressed hy the Soviet Union The new position expanded 
the number of allowable deployed ballistic missiles from 830 to approximately 
1250 and collapsed the two phases to -put everything on the table - The Soviets 
still responded unfavorably but agreed to discuss limitations'on total numbers 
of warheads as well as launcher limits In October 1983, the President
ed another modification to the U S proposal which incorporated features 
Of "build-down" and "trade off" strategies The offer was to Include reductions 
in strategic systems by establishing a "price for modernisation" by rearing 
that both sides reduce by either annual percentages or by destroying old 
warheads In numbers which exceeded the deployment of new warheads Also 
Implicit in the proposal was an offer to trade off areas of U S advantage 
(e g , bombers and cruise missiles) for a concomitant reduction in areas of 
Soviet advantage (e g , ICBM.) in order to achieve a more editable balance 
«hile respecting the different aspects of the respective force structures 
Unfortunately, the last U S modification had little time to be seriously 
considered The Soviets left the table in Geneva in December 2
The Soviet counter offers during the START negotiations are more difficult 
to ascertain They have not been publicised extensively However, the basic 
outline of the Soviet proposal has been reported in various periodicals and 
magazines with some consistency It can be characterized as resembling, as did 
SALT II, a Russian H ^ h R . ,  m  which hollow dolls are placed one inside the 
other from smaller to larger with the largest doll the outer shell As of the 
end of negotiates in December 1983 the Soviet START proposal included at least 
the following elements a limit of 1800 total strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles, no more than 1100 of which could be MIRVed (i a icB„s, SLBMs and
60
cruise missile-carrying bombers), of the 1200 no more than 1080 could be MlRVed 
ballistic missiles of which no more than 680 could be MlRVed iCBMs l„ 
addition, there was to be an unspecified limit on the total numbers of strategic
warheads The Soviet proposal was obviously one that had been gathering dust
since SALT II and with the possible exception of the additional warhead limit 
was clearly one prepared for SALT 1 1 1  The numbers are not significantly 
different in many respects from those forwarded in the ill-fated 1977 mission by
Secretary Vance However, the proposal itself „as not complete until Just
before the December 1,83 walRout and was therefore not a subject of extensive
negotiation Lite its ü S counterpart the Soviet proposal could also be 
subject to criticism
The Soviet START position did nothing to alleviate the U S concern over 
Soviet heavy missiles and their inherent capability to exceed the fractionation 
limits inherent in SALT II, nor did it address a total limit on warheads in any 
substantive way The Soviet proposal effectively limited the U S to its 
current systems, through modernisation constraints, while allowing the Soviet 
Union to increase, by further MIRVing its SLBM force, the number of warheads in 
its arsenal It also failed to propose a substantive limit on total numbers of 
warheads In short, although different in their approaches, both sides had 
forwarded proposals that were biased toward their advantage and therefore 
unacceptable to their negotiating partner However, in all fairness one must 
Soviet proposal was more subtle in its approach than was the ü S
proposal
During the interval between the end of START in 1983 and the resumption of 
talhs in March 1,83 there is Uttle doubt that both sides have examined their 
comparative positions There has been, however, no indication of how those
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numbers of people, organisations end influences involved in the pursuit of arms 
control have grown enormously m  addition. since the Rush-Bagot agreement in 
1817, the capability of the aforementioned groups to communicate and therefore 
coalesce and influence policy has grown dramatically That ability to 
communicate coupled with the traditional problem-solving approach of the „ s 
has created tremendous pressures for "arms control," with as many different 
definitions of "good arms control" as there are constituent groups The focus 
of debate then has become political, not technical, and the currency of 
discussion is perception, not fact
The first step as we move toward renewed negotiations should be to
re-evaluate the policy-making structure with an eye toward building a consensus
toward the goals of arms control and its role in national security policy As
was previously described, various approaches have been tried from ad hoc
committees, to strong central control, to the "team" approach Recognizing that
because of the variances of presidential style and authority that are inherent
in our system of government, the perfect approach does not exist, nonetheless 
improvements can be made
Procedural Consensus
The key to the development of a new consensus toward national security 
policy and by implication, arms control policy, lies partially in the 
development of a better policy organization As has been discussed earlier, 
single point of authority which has the major responsibility of conceptual 
interrelation of the tasks of the various departments seems to offer the 
greatest potential If correctly handled such an approach could avoid the 
Pitfalls of the single-person dominance evident in the Nixon administration,
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approach were those of Truman and Elsenhower Although it is too early to tell 
whether or not the Eeagan administration will adopt this model entirely It is 
fast becoming apparent that, insofar as arms control policy is concerned, the 
hifted from the more diverse nature of the first administration to 
greater authority for Secretary Schult, Kelnforcing that perception was the 
appointment of former chief INF negotiator Paul Nitze as the special advisor to
the SeCretary °f State f0r —  -  final test for the success or
failure of the advocated approach, which seems to have heen at least partially
- P t e d ,  will he effectiveness That test is not necessarily one of successful 
Policy but of coherent policy Although, the foregoing appears to be an 
advocacy of a return to the past It may he construed es such only because some 
administrations have been fraught with competition between the national 
security advisor and the state department, with the exception of course, of the 
single-person dominance of the Nixon years
“  "  "  “ • • - . . . . . . . . . . .  . „ . .......
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policy, minor structural changes might be in order in Congress The resurgence 
of Congress as an active participant in the foundation of foreign policy has 
been mentioned before However, that resurgence has not necessarily led to a 
more coherent policy, often it has led to further fractionation of policy 
objectives As was pointed out earlier presidents seem only able to achieve 
certain objectives by doing the unexpected Moreover, congressional actions in 
that regard have not gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union One Soviet observer 
reported
[Congress] can limit or increase appropriations in spite 
of the will of the administration, can reject or call into 
question the nomination of a head of government, can *
deliberately delay or even set aside the adoption of this or 
that piece of legislation All of which creates a situation 
whereby capitol hill is able to intervene in the plans of the 
White House or even frustrate them 4
Having watched over the last few years the ability of Congress to alter or 
frustrate efforts to ratify SALT II, to modernize strategic forces and to 
formulate trade policy with the Soviet Union, it should be clear to the Soviets 
that Congress will continue to be a force in the development of policy and arms 
control strategy The Soviets also seem to have difficulty accepting the lack 
of internal party control that a president can exercise over the congressional 
members in his party For example, during a visit to the Soviet Union- a. few 
years ago politburo member Grigori Romanov was told that there were Democratic 
senators who opposed SALT II despite President Carter's support of the treaty 
Romanov's response was an astonished " can't you discipline them7"5
One can only conjecture about the potential effect that an arms control 
strategy with a strong bi-partisan approach might have upon the Soviet Union 
However, the merits of such an approach on the U S policy process seem to be
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obvious to those in the U S government In fact, in proposing the "build-down" 
in the fall of 1983, an ad hoc group called the "gang of six" (Senators Nunn, 
Cohen and Percy and Representatives Aspin, Gore and Dicks) promised to do just 
that They said in a letter to the Scowcroft Commission
if the Reagan administration and the Congress can agree
on a sensible strategic program and on a reasonable approach 
toward arms control we will demonstrate that we have the 
P°iiticai cohesion and the long-term bipartisan commitment 
needed to maintain our strength and reduce the risk of war 6
The promise of compromise and cooperation inherent in that statement is one 
which should be formalized As was true during parts of SALT I and SALT II, 
there are members of Congress present as observers in the just resumed START 
talks However, outside the normal committees for military affairs and foreign 
affairs there appears to be little activity directed toward establishment of a 
joint arms control committee or subcommittee to be integrated with the already 
extant foreign affairs, intelligence and military oversight committees We 
might find it useful to develop a cadre, through the committee system, of 
informed legislators empowered to participate, through the interagency group 
process or at some other defined level, in the formulation of arms control 
policy By more fully integrating Congress into the negotiating process, and by 
establishing formal channels through which it might participate, the bipartisan 
support promised by the "gang of six" might well reduce the domestic turmoil 
present in the arms control arena since SALT II
Shaping the Environment
In addition to building a more coherent arms control policy through 
functional modification of bureaucracies, it is equally important that one seek
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to modify the political environment within which arms control must function 
Issues of national security are not taken lightly by either of the two 
superpowers However, it should be evident that the exchange of rhetoric 
between the Soviet Union and the United States since the signing of SALT II has 
done little save exacerbate tensions between them Already evident in the last 
year of the first Reagan administration was the softening of statements away 
from "the focus of evil in the world" or "the march of freedom will leave
Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history" toward a softer line As recently 
as March 1985, when questioned about an incident in Berlin which resulted in the 
death of a U S Army major at the hands of a Soviet sentry, President Reagan 
responded that it made him more "anxious to talk" with the Soviet General Party 
Secretary Gorbachev While the Soviets have done little to reciprocate in terms 
of rhetorical moderation, one could hardly state that their image after KAL 007 
and the aforementioned incident with Major Nicholson has added to the 
credibility of their statements Those incidents may well have aided the U S 
as it moves toward a more realistic appreciation of what arms control can 
accomplish while maintaining rational evaluation of relationships between the 
two nations Opponents of detente most frequently criticized it as lulling the 
U S into a false sense of security It might also be pointed out that when a 
false sense of security is ruptured the response is often out of proportion to 
the action which caused the rupture Americans tend to see themselves as 
"street smart", they have little difficulty recognizing that domestic political 
figures with widely divergent reputations such as Senators Goldwater and Kennedy 
can and do agree on certain issues, but remain unalterably opposed on others 
That sort of pragmatic assessment can be used to advantage in arms control 
What must be done is to attempt to build a consensus and objective assessment of
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U S -Soviet relations based more on diplomatie skill and realistic military 
strategy than on Moscow's belligerence or ineptitude
A major first step toward a renewed emphasis on political environment, 
diplomatic maneuver and basic tension reduction could well involve a 
re-examination of those arms control treaties that have been negotiated, remain 
unratified, but are being observed That reconsideration could help to draw 
those who supported and opposed those agreements into the movement toward a new 
consensus Admittedly, such a move might represent a "step backward" to some 
However, modification of SALT II was a major thrust of its domestic opponents, 
and with the Soviet emphasis on "preserving past efforts," one could well argue 
that it is far more important to gain essential modification and thereby more 
nearly approach a "good agreement" than to leave it in limbo to embark on more 
ambitious projects In addition, such a step removes arguments over whether one 
side or the other has violated a "moral commitment" or an international treaty 
At worst, reconsideration could serve to assuage public concerns domestically 
and abroad over the commitment of both sides to reasonable arms control These 
and other steps can lead to the creation of an atmosphere more amenable to 
serious negotiation
As has been pointed out earlier in this paper, confidence building is an 
essential part of the maintenance of rekindled relations or, perhaps more 
properly, the management of adversarial relationships In that respect the 
Reagan administration has again shown flexibility in offering to open 
negotiations on chemical weapons, maintain negotiations and trade on grain and 
other agricultural commodities, discussed "hotline" upgrades and continue talks 
on how to deal with incidents at sea between the two navies However, all the 
possible steps alluded to from modification of the policy apparatus, the
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reconsideration or modification of treaties, to a more extensive effort in those 
confidence building measures peripheral to the central question pale in 
comparison to the need for a more realistic assessment of our arms control 
proposals and its implications for national security and military strategy
U S arms control proposals should make sense for American defense planning 
and where possible allow flexibility to consider legitimate Soviet defense 
concerns While it could be argued that the last U S proposal offering 
trade-offs was a step in the proper direction in the latter category, in context 
the proposal does little for the former As a basic criterion, if arms control 
cannot, by itself, solve the more basic problems of national security it should 
not be allowed to exacerbate them As has been pointed out earlier, at least 
for the near term disarmament is impractical Moreover, given the adversarial 
relationship that does and will continue to exist with the Soviet Union, "deep 
cuts", however politically attractive, are highly improbable The additional 
complication of extensive research by both sides into defensive systems only 
serves to complicate strategic planning and makes mandatory a re-examination of 
our arms control strategy
"Old" Frameworks and "Old" Problems
The U S START proposal has been outlined earlier and according to 
Ambassador Rowney the U S has "essentially resubmitted its proposals at the 
START talks "7 As has been pointed out by many others as they labeled it 
"nonnegotiable" the U S proposal would virtually require the Soviets to 
restructure their offensive forces What is seldom discussed is the effect on 
U S forces if the Soviets accepted our proposal Begin with the proposition 
that the Soviet restructured to a force which did indeed consist of 400 bombers
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with an unspecified number of weapons Then consider that the U S has largely 
dismantled its defenses against the air breathing threat and the Soviet Union 
has deployed the most extensive defenses in the world against penetrating 
aircraft Moreover, while it is apparently agreed that single warhead missiles 
create less lucrative and more dispersed targets and thereby a more stable 
environment, 5000 ballistic missile warheads on approximately 1250 missiles is 
hardly a disincentive to MIRV If one adds an announced willingness to trade 
U S bombers with cruise missiles for Soviet ICBMs of whatever type, then the 
defensive burden on Soviet air defenses is lightened with no concomitant 
reduction in the threat to U S targets Finally, in the current environment of 
mistrust, fraught with accusation and counter accusation over suspected treaty 
violations, a proposal which would virtually force both sides to pursue less 
verifiable systems (e g , mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles) may not be 
desirable, let alone achievable In short the U S proposal has changed the 
units of accent from launchers to warheads for ballistic missiles, retained the 
capability to MIRV aircraft and forced both sides to pursue less verifiable 
systems with the assumption that fewer ICBMs create a more stable environment 
What might mitigate the disadvantages the U S faces in ICBM throwweight today 
may not be a reasonable solution for tomorrow
The Soviet proposal, as has been stated, maintains essentially the same 
categories and sublimits proposed in SALT II As currently designed it is 
reported that the Soviet proposal also calls for a virtual halt to all U S 
modernization programs, and some constraints on U S forward based systems, and 
unspecified limits on warheads to include bomber gravity weapons 8 The 
proposal, while patently unfair in the latter categories, does offer some basis 
for discussion in terms of overall limits and sublimits It has the advantage
/
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of codified categories of systems and contrasted to the U S proposal offers the 
opportunity for both sides to gradually restructure their force toward less 
destabilizing deployments For example, gradual reductions in warhead ceilings, 
MIRV sublimits and either missile size or warhead fractionation limits could 
make it in the best interest of both sides to move away from MIRV technology 
An additional advantage for the military planners of both sides is an orderly 
reduction with a limited ability to mix and match forces within predetermined or 
"traditional" categories
By maintaining total strategic nuclear vehicle counts at a higher level in 
proportion to the MIRV sublimits one can create a disincentive to MIRV 
Notional agreements, beginning with SALT II might appear as follows
SALT II______ ______ START_______  START II
2250 SNDV 1800 SNDV 1800 SNDV
1320 MIRV 1200 MIRV 1000 MIRV
ICBM, SLBM ICBM, SLBM ICBM, SLBM
CMC CMC CMC
1,200 1,080 800
MIRV MIRV MIRV
ICBM ICBM ICBM
SLBM SLBM SLBM
820 680 400
MIRV MIRV MIRVICBM ICBM ICBM
If associated with fractionation limits on modernized systems which are 
smaller than those currently allowed under SALT II (i e , 14 warheads on SLBMs 
and 10 on ICBMs) and a ceiling on total warheads, levels could be reduced even 
further while maintaining the incentive to field single warhead ICBMs and SLBMs 
and allow the U S to continue to field its traditional Triad without forcing 
the Soviet Union to abandon its reliance upon landbased ICBMs In short, it
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recognizes the differing paths of force structure evolution without generating 
undue incentive to radically alter that force structure
Such an approach may also ease the transition to more defensively oriented 
strategies As was pointed out earlier, the Soviets have embraced the concept 
of point or terminal area defense through a continuing buildup and modernization 
of both defenses against penetrating aircraft and upgrade of the Moscow ABM 
system as well as a continuing research program in ABM defense Their concern 
strategic defense initiative would appear to be with proposed boost 
phase interception That seems to be a valid concern from a military 
standpoint After all, in the current strategic environment a relatively small 
number of vehicles represents a much larger number of warheads for both sides 
For example just over 600 SS-18 and SS-19 missiles could carry 50% or more of 
the estimated Soviet strategic arsenal While admittedly a boost phase 
intercept capability would, at the moment, appear more lucrative for defense, it 
could hardly be seen as contributing to stability from the Soviet standpoint 
Moreover, its efficacy has yet to be proven or even fully researched Point 
defense of retaliatory forces appears to be the best available option, 
technically, at present It could also serve to alleviate U S concerns about 
"heavy" missile advantages by providing "dynamic hardening" of U S missile 
silos as well as assuaging Soviet concerns over space-based interceptors
Point defenses in combination with gradual reductions in MIRV sublimits 
could also increase the incentive toward single warhead systems As the move 
away from MIRVs takes place, an evolution toward defensive systems which then 
are designed to counter more boosters with fewer warheads on each (e g boost + 
midcourse phase) can be gradually deployed as research provides effective and 
efficient systems In other words, proven defensive technologies which increase
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the uncertainty of successful attack on both sides while not inherently 
threatening the retaliatory forces of the other may well be the key to a 
successful transition In addition, it would place the greatest reliance upon 
proven technologies through the transition from a "booster poor/warhead rich" 
environment to a "warhead poor/booster rich" environment Though admittedly far 
from perfect, the proposed transition plan may solve two major problems First, 
if integrated with an incremental approach which provides a disincentive to MIRV 
and at least caps potential growth in numbers of launchers, it eliminates the 
most obvious response to defensive measures —  to overwhelm them with sheer 
numbers Second, if the above approach does not assist in building a more 
stable strategic environment, at least it does not contribute to further 
instability Fully realizing that such an approach may well mean renegotiation 
of the 1972 ABM treaty, as was said before, treaty making is only in part an 
exercise in prescience The ABM treaty was negotiated with the idea that 
reductions in weapons and weapons systems would follow as a matter of course 
They have not As both sides move toward a stable number of weapons systems and 
a reduced or stable number of weapons, as has been advocated here, the emphasis 
on survivability and/or mobility will increase As strategic environments 
change and as both sides seek a more stable relationship based less upon the 
ability to destroy one another and more on the ability to defend one'e homeland, 
renegotiation may well be the most prudent course to follow
Gradual reduction in predefined categories of accountable force structure 
from one agreement to the next provide several added benefits in terras of 
verification, confidence building, coalition building and public acceptance 
The technological challenge of verification and the problems associated with its 
twin, compliance, may be eased as well though a framework similar to SALT II and
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the Soviet proposal If launchers continue to be the unit of account and 
gradual transition is made to mobile systems, some inroads are possible into 
either the Soviet reluctance to consider more intrusive means of inspection or, 
alternatively, technological advances in national technical means of 
ver*-fication Moreover, smaller reductions are inherently less threatening
politically to the national security establishments of both sides That alone 
may reduce the inertia of the technological imperative and enhance the 
possibilities of compliance without the threat of sanction
From the perspective of coalition building within the government, a 
continuing program of arms negotiation which has at its core a well defined 
medium of exchange and a demonstrable long-term plan for two or more offensive 
agreements which gradually incorporate defensive systems, should gain support 
from both parties and lessen the chances for rejection/non-ratification It
should be evident from public dialogue that it is becoming more improbable that 
a democracy will be able to continue to convince its people that the maintenance 
of their "safe" existence can only be based upon the threat of their 
extermination
Finally, given the penchant for "demonstrated progress" evident in the 
statements of political leaders and public interest groups, a program which 
offers a series of agreements, even though they may yield only small reductions 
or serve to limit future growth, could be politically effective in managing both 
a reduction in tension and a continuing military modernization program Most 
certainly it will be more acceptable than protracted negotiations toward 
ill-defined and sometimes mutually exclusive goals of drastic reductions and 
strategic stabilization
If there are a few generalized lessons to be learned from a survey of the
t.
74
history of arms control, the first is probably that it has been oversold as a 
"magic cure" for national security concerns in the nuclear age Another may 
well be when arms control is needed most, e g ,  when tensions are high, it is 
least likely to be attainable Drastic oscillations in threat estimates and 
unilateral military solutions are difficult to justify and virtually impossible 
to sustain could be a third Although there are indisputably many others, the 
last to be mentioned here is that when arms control becomes the centerpiece of 
relations between states it will inevitably fall victim to all the vicissitudes 
of domestic and international politics as well as its own technical 
difficulties These few lessons argue for a more moderate approach to arms 
control, more moderate expectations and greater moderation in establishing the 
threat, with neither the dismissal of Soviet capabilities and intentions of the 
early Carter years or the polemic and hype of the early years of the first 
Reagan administration It may be impossible to halt the swing of the pendulum, 
given the nature of American politics, however, if it can be made to describe a 
smaller arc we will at least, in part, succeed A reasonable approach to 
confidence building through areas peripheral to arms control, as well as the 
arms control process itself, can pay dividends in the form of increased domestic 
support, from both elected and electorate, but only with leaders able and 
willing to provide a clear outline of their strategy and build a cooperative 
consensus within the government and among the people A sound, incremental 
approach such as advocated in this paper may assist toward that goal
In sum, there is now, to borrow a phrase, "a window of opportunity " The 
U b can modify its approach to arras control in minor ways to its greater 
advantage Whether by accident or design, the U S has acquired the means 
whereby it may facilitate negotiations, and by accepting the Soviet framework,
75
achieve political and propaganda advantage Additionally, we can ease some of 
the difficult questions surrounding the transition to defensive postures and 
demonstrate progress toward an ongoing, long-term arms control regime A larger 
step toward that window could be made through the simple expedient of accepting, 
as the Soviets have proposed, a framework for negotiation in strategic arms that 
has existed since the 1974 Vladivostok accord Included in our willingness to 
accept the "old" framework must be an unwillingness to be bound by the "old" 
problems A relationship does exist between offensive and defensive forces We 
should be willing to state, unilaterally if necessary, that we are prepared to 
negotiate the conditions of that relationship, but, that our long-term strategy 
is to develop strategic defenses and to describe an orderly transition from 
offensive strategies to a defensive orientation To speak of deep reductions in 
offensive forces and to profess an unwillingness to negotiate either proposed 
defensive systems or the means or method of their deployment is to deny access 
to that orderly transition At present our opportunities to reduce 
international tension, build and maintain a viable coalition for a more 
consistent foreign policy, and demonstrate a reasonable, pragmatic approach to 
arms control is unique To fail to seize that opportunity, at least in the
strategic arms control arena, would find us guilty of faults more commonly 
attributed to the Soviets
They often ask for a whole loaf where they could get half a 
loaf -  and wind up with nothing They fritter awav the 
credibility of their threats and the value of thei/promises 
the two key tools for every diplomat They cannot find the ’
br ! ^  0SagfS °f demandS and inducements They fight furious battles against an empty phrase or vague principle8 10
(W ¿di'.
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